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THE ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER
IN REPRESENTING THE MENTALLY IMPAIRED
DEFENDANT: ZEALOUS ADVOCATE OR OFFICER
OF THE COURT?
RODNEY J. UPHOFF*
This Article examines a difficult question in the representation of mentally im-
paired criminal defendants: should counsel be obligated to inform the court of doubts
about a client's competency to stand trial even though doing so may be contrary to
the client's wishes or best interests? Professor Rodney J. Uphoff analyzes authorities
that impose such an obligation on defense lawyers, including an American Bar Asso-
ciation Criminal Justice Standard and a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, State v. Johnson. Uphoff concludes that these authorities needlessly undercut
the mentally impaired defendant's right to zealous representation. He proposes an
alternative ethical model for defense attorneys, in which counsel would make a case-
by-case determination.
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of the criminal defense lawyer is to provide zealous repre-
sentation within the bounds of law.' In theory, the criminal defense
lawyer, as vigorous advocate, will use any legitimate means of securing
a favorable result for a client, constrained only by counsel's competing
responsibilities as an officer of the court.2 In practice, however, defense
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A. 1972,
University of Wisconsin; M. Sc. 1973, London School of Economics; J.D. 1976, University of
Wisconsin. I wish to thank Ted Schneyer, Frank Remington, Booth Fowler and Ben Kempinen
for their comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank Hiram Puig-Lugo, Lorna Hemp and
Donna Fogell for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
I. MODEL CODEOF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1981). Canon 7 of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility broadly outlines the scope of zealous representation. See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983). Hereinafter, the MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (198 1) and provisions thereof will be cited as MODEL CODE; the MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) and provisions thereof will be cited as MODEL RULE(S).
2. "The basic duty the lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of justice is to
serve as the accused's counselor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to the utmost of his or
her learning and ability and according to law." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-1.1 (2d ed.
1980) and commentary. Hereinafter, the STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) and pro-
visions thereof will be cited as ABA STANDARD(S). As Chief Justice Burger indicated in Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), however, the lawyer's "overarching duty" to advocate and ad-
vance the client's interests is limited by the lawyer's "equally solemn" responsibilities and duties as
an officer of the court. Id. at 166-68. In addition, as numerous commentators have observed, a host
of variables both individual and systemic affect the behavior and practices of criminal defense
lawyers. For a discussion of the divergence between theory and practice in the local criminal justice
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counsel often faces considerable uncertainty in determining what con-
stitutes appropriate advocacy in a given situation.3 Nonetheless, coun-
sel regularly must make tough choices among conflicting ethical norms.
Most criminal practitioners, lacking clear answers and being pressed
for time, will base such decisions largely on their understanding of what
is expected of a lawyer representing a "man in trouble."4 Not only do
most criminal defense lawyers view their role as requiring unwavering
loyalty to their clients, but this client-above-all perspective shapes their
resolution of hard ethical issues.5
The ethical issues become more difficult to resolve, however, when
the criminal defense lawyer finds herself representing a mentally im-
paired defendant. Unable to establish a normal lawyer-client relation-
ship and unsure of the client's competency,6 defense counsel struggles
systems, see, e.g., Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation
of a Profession, I LAW & Soc'Y REV. at 15 (1967); A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982).
3. As the Pennsylvania Superior Court observed in overturning the convictions of two
lawyers who failed to turn over a murder weapon: "Attorneys face a distressing paucity ofdisposi-
tive precedent to guide them in balancing their duty of zealous representation against their duty as
officers of the court." Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 27, 514 A.2d 114, 125 (1986).
See also J. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS ch. 6 (1986). For a lengthy discussion of the diffi-
cult ethical dilemmas confronting the criminal practitioner, see M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS
IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975).
4. For an eloquent defense of the position that a lawyer's willingness to zealously de-
fend his client-the "man-in-trouble"--is essential to our system of justice, see D. MELLINKOFF,
THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973). See also M. FREEDMAN, supra note 3; Babcock, Defending
the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1983-1984); Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Founda-
tions of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). Others, however, have criticized the
adversary system and the lawyer's reliance on the "adversary system excuse." See, e.g., Luban,
The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 83
(D. Luban ed. 1983); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics,
1978 Wis. L. REV. 29; Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63
(1980); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975); Wasser-
strom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HuM. RTs. 1 (1975). A defense or critique of
the adversary system examining the lawyer's role as a zealous advocate is beyond the scope of this
Article. Assuming the legitimacy of the existing ethical rules requiring the criminal defense lawyer
to be a zealous advocate, therefore, this Article focuses on whether the mentally impaired defen-
dant is also entitled to zealous representation. It is clear that most criminal defense lawyers view
representing their clients zealously as their primary responsibility. Freedman, Professional Respon-
sibility in D.C.: A Survey, 1972 RES IPSA LOQUITUR 60. Empirical support for the proposition that
this client-above-all perspective shapes the way lawyers resolve ethical issues can be found in K.
MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK (1985). It is also
true that knowing how lawyers behave does not help us answer how they ought to behave.
Schneyer, Getting from "Is" to "Ought" in Legal Ethics: Mann s Defending White-Collar Crime,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 903.
5. See supra note 4; Chernoff& Schaffer, Defending the Mentally Ill: Ethical Quicksand,
10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 505, 515 (1972). This observation, as are many in this Article, is also based
on my experiences as a public defender and Chief Staff Attorney of the Milwaukee office of the
Wisconsin State Public Defender, conversations with other criminal defense lawyers and the re-
sponses of the students handling criminal cases in the clinical program I direct at the University of
Wisconsin Law School.
6. In Wisconsin, a defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he suffers from a mental
illness which renders him incapable of understanding the proceedings against him or assisting in
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with difficult questions regarding her proper role. Should the defen-
dant's irrational choices be respected, or may counsel make choices
based on her assessment of the client's best interest? Does a client's
mental impairment alter the responsibilities or role of defense counsel?
Is there a point at which the defendant's mental disability ought to
change the lawyer's role from that of advocate to that of guardian or
friend of the court?
As a vehicle for exploring the role of defense counsel when repre-
senting a mentally impaired defendant, this Article focuses on a specific
issue: is defense counsel obligated to inform the trial court of her doubts
about her client's competency to stand trial even though doing so is
contrary to her client's best interests or wishes? Section II of the Article
discusses the difficulties the competency issue poses for the criminal
practitioner. Section III reviews the efforts of an experienced criminal
defense lawyer who resolved those difficulties by not raising the issue of
the competency of his mentally impaired client, Oliver Johnson,
charged with first degree murder. In State v. Johnson,7 however, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected that lawyer's decision and found his
representation deficient. The court held that defense counsel has an af-
firmative duty to raise the competency issue whenever counsel has some
reason to doubt the defendant's competency.
Section IV examines the Johnson decision and Standard 7-4.2 of
the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice (ABA
Standards), which imposes a similar obligation upon defense counsel.8
The Article concludes that both Standard 7-4.2 and Johnson should be
reconsidered because they needlessly undercut the mentally impaired
defendant's right to zealous representation. Finally, the Article pro-
poses that defense counsel be permitted to make a case-by-case determi-
nation whether to raise competency and discusses the critical factors
counsel must analyze in making that determination.
his defense. WIS. STAT. § 971.13(t) (1985-1986). This competency standard, based on Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), is substantially followed in all jurisdictions. S. BRAKEL & R.
ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 410 (rev. ed. 1971). For a detailed discussion of the
historical development of the competency doctrine, see Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial. De-
velopments in the Law, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SO-
CIAL SCIENCE 3 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
7. 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986) (reversing State v. Johnson, 126 Wis. 2d 8,
374 N.W.2d 637 (Ct. App. 1985)).
8. ABA STANDARD 7-4.2(c) states:
Defense counsel should move for evaluation of the defendant's competence to stand trial
whenever the defense counsel has a good faith doubt as to the defendant's competence. If
the client objects to such a motion being made, counsel may move for evaluation over the
client's objection. In any event, counsel should make known to the court and to the
prosecutor those facts known to counsel which raise the good faith doubt of competence.
1988:65
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II. THE COMPETENCY ISSUE
In the normal lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer is called upon
to establish a relationship of trust and confidence founded on the law-
yer's pledge of confidentiality.9 Reassured by this pledge, the client re-
lates facts to defense counsel and listens to counsel's advice. A criminal
defense lawyer has a clear duty to consult with her client and to keep
that client informed of case developments.' 0 As a trusted counselor, the
lawyer's role is to assist the client in making informed decisions about
the case, not to unilaterally decide what is in the client's best interest.'1
Although authorities disagree as to whose decision should control' 2 in
9. ABA STANDARD 4-3.1 and commentary; MODEL CODE EC 4-1. See also MODEL RULE
1.6 comment.
10. ABA STANDARD 4-3.8; MODEL RULE 1.4. See also MODEL CODE EC 7-8 AND EC 9-2.
II. ABA STANDARD 4-5.2; MODEL CODE EC 7-7 and EC 7-8. See also MODEL RULE 1.2
and comment.
12. ABA STANDARD 4-5.2 provides:
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the ac-
cused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made
by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter; (ii) whether
to waive jury trial; (iii) whether to testify in his or her own behalf.
(b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-
examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all
other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consul-
tation with the client.
(c) If a disagreement on significant matters of tactics or strategy arises between the
lawyer and the client, the lawyer should make a record of the circumstances, the lawyer's
advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached. The record should be made in a manner
which protects the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.
There is considerable disagreement as to whether particular decisions are strategic or funda-
mental. Compare, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's view in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 749 (1983)
(appellate counsel need not raise every issue a defendant requests) with that of Justice Brennan
dissenting in Jones, 463 U.S. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (function of appellate counsel is to
protect the dignity and autonomy of the client by assisting him in making informed choices).
Brennan draws support from MODEL CODE EC 7-7, which states that "the authority to make
decisions is exclusively that of the client" except for decisions "not affecting the merits of the cause
or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client." Further, EC 7-8 states that "the lawyer should
always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods be-
cause of nonlegal factors is ultimately for the client." See also EC 7-1. Similarly, Model Rule 1.2(a)
indicates that "a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representa-
tion ... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued." As the
comment to Rule 1.2 observes, however, "a clear distinction between objectives and means some-
times cannot be drawn." The ethics codes simply do not define the ultimate allocation of decision-
making responsibility in many instances. Maute, Allocation of Decisionmaking Authority Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1049, 1052-56 (1984). See generally
Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986); Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015
(1981); DeFoor & Mitchell, Hybrid Representation: An Analysis of a Criminal Defendant's Right to
Participate as Co-Counsel at Trial, 10 STETSON L. REV. 191 (1981); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
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certain matters, the criminal defendant clearly is to make all fundamen-
tal case decisions. 13
A criminal defense lawyer representing a mentally impaired client,
however, may find it difficult to establish a normal lawyer-client rela-
tionship. The difficulties frequently begin at the initial meeting between
lawyer and client. Defendants may be hostile, abusive and physically
threatening, or they may sit silently, totally unresponsive to any inquir-
ies. Some defendants babble incoherently. Others intermittently talk
sense and then nonsense. Whatever the nature of the problem, the law-
yer's inability to engage the defendant in a normal lawyer-client collo-
quy creates tension in the relationship.
Communication difficulties raise other concerns for defense coun-
sel. The lawyer may be unsure whether the client appreciates the pledge
of confidentiality or understands that the lawyer is serving as the cli-
ent's advocate. Defense counsel may be uncertain whether the client
trusts her. Thus, even if the client is capable of talking about the facts of
the case, the lawyer may be wary of relying on the client as a source of
information.' 4 Moreover, the lawyer may be unsure whether the client
understands any of the advice or information the lawyer is giving. If the
client cannot process information or understand the lawyer's advice,
then he may not be able to weigh options intelligently and make in-
formed decisions. The client's inability to make informed fundamental
decisions forces defense counsel to assume decisionmaking responsibil-
ity for the client or to raise the issue of the client's competency. 15
13. At a minimum, the fundamental decisions reserved for the criminal defendant are
the plea to be entered, whether to waive a jury trial, whether the client will testify and whether to
appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); MODEL RULE 1.2; ABA STANDARD 4-5.2 and
commentary.
14. Indigent defendants often mistrust the lawyers appointed to represent them. Jones v.
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Burt, supra note 12. In my
experience, mentally impaired clients, especially schizophrenics, often are more mistrustful of
counsel. Counsel must be careful, therefore, in relying on information supplied by a mentally
impaired client.
15. For an excellent discussion of the role problems confronting the civil practitioner
with a marginally impaired client, see Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism: Lawyer Decision-
making and the Questionably Competent Client, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515. Tremblay examines six
options the civil lawyer has for dealing with a client whose decisionmaking capacity is impaired:
(1) follow the client's wishes even though disastrous; (2) seek a guardian; (3) rely on next of kin as
proxy decisionmaker;. (4) act as de facto guardian; (5) seek to persuade the client to do what the
lawyer feels is appropriate; (6) withdraw. Although Tremblay sees ethical and other problems with
each option, he concludes that guardianship should be pursued in extreme cases; some reliance on
family is appropriate; noncoercive persuasion is justified in less extreme cases; and unilateral usur-
pation of client autonomy is never warranted except in emergencies. Id. at 584.
Tremblay acknowledges that the defense lawyer's role may be different in the criminal con-
text. Id. at 518. Differences in criminal practice and constitutional mandates limit the viability of
Tremblay's proposed options in the criminal setting. See also infra note 168 and accompanying
text.
1988:65
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To be competent, a defendant must have "sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing... and.., a rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings against him."'6 Clearly, many mentally ill defendants are
legally competent to stand trial.' 7 Despite their mental illness, such cli-
ents can interact adequately with defense counsel and possess a suffi-
cient understanding of the proceedings. If, however, defense counsel
finds that the defendant's mental impairment is impinging upon the
lawyer-client relationship or causing her to doubt the client's under-
standing of the proceedings, counsel must carefully consider the compe-
tency issue. 18
Careful consideration of the issue may, nonetheless, leave defense
counsel in a confusing bind. The lawyer may recognize that the defen-
dant's mental condition is adversely affecting the lawyer-client relation-
ship and the client's decisionmaking ability. Thus, the mentally im-
paired client may be making very poor decisions or be unable to decide
at all. Committed to the principle of client decisionmaking, counsel
may find it difficult to respect the choices, particularly irrational ones,
16. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). See also supra note 6; ABA STAN-
DARD 7-4.1 and commentary. In making a competency determination, it is useful to address three
questions: (1) is the defendant suffering from a mental disorder serious enough to justify a finding
of incompetency? (2) is the defendant's mental state causing an incapacity relevant to the proceed-
ings he is to participate in? (3) does the defendant appear to manifest a sufficient degree of incapac-
ity as to render him incompetent for a given proceeding? Drob, Berger & Weinstein, Competency
to Stand Trial. A Conceptual Modelfor its Proper Assessment, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 85, 85-89 (1987).
17. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921, 924-32
(1985); ABA STANDARDS at 7-175. See also State ex rel. Haskins v. Dodge County, 62 Wis. 2d 250,
264-66, 214 N.W.2d 575, 582-83 (1974) (more is required than just mental illness to support a
finding of incompetency to stand trial).
18. ABA Standard 4-4.1 requires the defense lawyer to investigate the circumstances of
the case promptly, exploring all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the
possible penalty. Many jurisdictions have adopted this Standard. See, e.g., State v. Felton, 110
Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983) (defense lawyer found ineffective for failing to investigate an
insanity defense).
Unquestionably, defense counsel must investigate and analyze the competency issue if the
defendant's appearance, action or statements suggest he is incompetent. See infra notes 88 and 97
and accompanying text. See also Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1059 (1985); Brennan v. Blankenship, 472 F. Supp. 149, 156-57 (W.D. Va. 1979),
afl'd, 624 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1980); Loe v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va. 1982); People
v. Howard, 74 Ill. App. 3d 138 (1979).
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of an impaired decisionmaker.19 In practice, many lawyers are reluc-
tant to permit an impaired client to make harmful decisions.2 °
This reluctance stems from defense counsel's loyalty to the "man
in trouble," her desire to secure a favorable disposition for the client, a
commitment to challenging the State's case and her sense of profes-
sional worth. Further, the uncertain nature of the decision or of the
process the client used to reach that decision may deter counsel from
following a client's harmful decision. As the client's irrationality be-
comes more pronounced, the lawyer feels pressure either to assume a
more paternalistic role or to raise the issue of the client's competency.2
Raising competency, however, may have serious costs for the
defendant.22 Competency evaluations are usually done on an inpatient
basis and may lead to lengthy hospitalization. 23 This hospitalization
19. The principle of client decisionmaking-the client has the right to make crucial deci-
sions about his life-finds support in both ethics codes. See supra note 12. In order to maximize
this principle and the value of client autonomy, a number of commentators have promoted the
concept of client-centered advocacy. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUN-
SELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977); G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PRO-
CESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978). The client-centered approach is
a method of practice involving empathetic listening designed to enable the client to exercise his
right to choose based on his own values, free of lawyer dominance. See also Ellmann, Lawyers and
Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987). Other commentators have stressed the importance of struc-
turing the lawyer-client relationship to foster client autonomy. See, e.g., Fried, supra note 4; M.
FREEDMAN, supra note 3. While it may be true that in different legal contexts and with different
clients the client-centered model may be inappropriate, the serious potential consequences, specific
constitutional protections and the indeterminacy of the potential injury to the public suggest that
client decisionmaking and client autonomy are particularly appropriate for the criminal defen-
dant. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Law-
yers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 781, 795 (1987).
20. Chernoff& Schaffer, supra note 5, at 526. See also Tremblay, supra note 15, at 521-
26.
21. The paternalistic lawyer acts to obtain a result which the lawyer perceives to be in the
client's best interest regardless of the client's expressed desires. For a description of this paternalis-
tic approach, see Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454; Wasser-
strom, supra note 4. In practice, some lawyers regularly adopt a paternalistic approach and set
objectives as well as make decisions based on their assessment of their clients' interests. See Maute,
supra note 12, at 1050; Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, in ROUGH JUSTICE: PER-
SPECTIVES ON LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS 89, 101 (J. Robertson ed. 1974).
22. The commentary to ABA Standard 7-4.2 acknowledges the serious costs and injus-
tices visited on some defendants as a result of the competency process. ABA STANDARDS at 7-179.
See also infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. Although the drafters of these Standards sug-
gest that full implementation of all the Standards on competency would eliminate many of the
negative aspects of the process, that ideal jurisdiction does not yet exist.
23. R. Miller & E. Germain, Inpatient Versus Outpatient Evaluation of Competency to
Stand Trial: A Survey and an Analsyis 1-3 (unpublished paper presented at meeting of the Ameri-
can Academy of Psychiatry and the Law) (Oct. 17, 1987). See also Winick, supra note 17, at 941-
42; Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 513. Raising competency may jeopardize a defendant's
pretrial release. Although section 971.14(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides for both inpatient
and outpatient competency evaluations, most are done on an inpatient basis. WIS. STAT.
§ 971.14(2) (1985-1986). The evaluations generally take several weeks to complete. If there is to be
a contested hearing, scheduling will extend the defendant's incarceration. If, following the hearing,
the defendant is found incompetent, he may be committed to a mental institution for a period not
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usually takes place in a maximum-security institution with minimum
treatment. 24 Such hospitalization is often unnecessary and unduly stig-
matizing. Additionally, prolonged hospitalization may jeopardize the
defendant's right to a fair trial. 25 For many defendants, particularly
those charged with minor offenses, raising competency subjects the
defendant to a far greater deprivation of his liberty than if he were con-
victed of the crime with which he is charged.
Given their client-above-all perspective, most defense lawyers will
balk at taking action against their clients' interests. 26 Hence, many law-
yers will be reluctant to raise competency if they believe that doing so
will be detrimental to their clients. This is especially true if the client
also expresses a clear desire not to raise the competency issue. More-
over, raising competency may require the lawyer to disclose confiden-
tial communications and destroy an already fragile lawyer-client rela-
tionship.2  While in some cases the severity of the client's impairment
dictates that the issue be raised,28 in many other cases the lawyer is
under strong pressure not to raise competency.
There are, however, countervailing pressures on the defense law-
yer. Many of the lawyers representing mentally impaired defendants
are public defenders or court-appointed lawyers. 29 To cope with high
case loads, low hourly rates and inexperience, these lawyers may find
raising competency an attractive means of dealing with a difficult client.
Raising competency sometimes represents a form of defensive lawyer-
ing. Unsure of how to proceed, the lawyer plays it safe by raising the
to exceed 18 months or the maximum sentence for the offense charged, whichever is less. Wis.
STAT. § 971.14(5) (1985-1986). A defendant who is restored to competency, but later becomes
incompetent, may be committed for the difference between 24 months and his previous commit-
ment, or 18 months, whichever is less. Wis. STAT. § 971.14(5)(d) (1985-1986). Finally, a defendant
who is unlikely to regain competency may be the subject of civil commitment proceedings. Wis.
STAT. § 971.14(6)(b) (1985-1986).
24. Winick, supra note 17, at 942-43. Moreover, inpatient confinement in some cases
may actually decrease the defendant's level of competence. Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 5, at
513.
25. Winick, supra note 17, at 947-49.
26. My own experience bears this out as do K. MANN, supra note 4 and M. FREEDMAN,
supra note 3. See also Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 515 (suggesting that defense lawyers
will have to violate ethical and professional obligations in order to secure just results for their
mentally ill clients). Moreover, various provisions of the Model Code and Model Rules prohibit
taking action contrary to the client's interest. See, e.g., MODEL CODE DR 7-101(A)(3) (a lawyer
shall not prejudice or damage a client except as required by DR 7-102(B)). As note 114 infra and
the accompanying text indicate, DR 7-102(B) does not require disclosure of counsel's doubts
about a client's competency.
27. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
29. Winick, supra note 17, at 941. In Wisconsin, the overwhelming majority of criminal
defendants, including the mentally impaired, are represented by public defenders or private attor-
neys appointed by the State Public Defender.
HeinOnline  -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 72 1988
1988:65 Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?
issue in the hope that the client will be restored to mental health and be
capable of responding like a "normal" client.3"
Under conflicting pressure on the competency issue and uncertain
about respecting the choices of a mentally impaired defendant, the law-
yer may adopt a paternalistic role and assume decisionmaking respon-
sibility for the client. This role may look particularly inviting when the
client's disability prevents him from clearly expressing any choices or
when those choices clash with the client's apparent best interest. There
is considerable pressure on the lawyer to play such a role. The lawyer,
as helper and friend,3" feels a strong need to render assistance and guid-
ance to a helpless client. Many clients encourage this paternalistic feel-
ing by asking their lawyer to make decisions for them.32 For a variety
of reasons, other actors in the system will often prod defense counsel to
adopt this role.33 The lawyer's lack of patience, the press of time, finan-
cial considerations or the ease of unilateral decisionmaking may also
push counsel to make decisions for the client based on the lawyer's per-
ception of the client's best interest.
Nevertheless, many defense lawyers will hesitate to assume this pa-
ternalistic role. Criminal defense lawyers are trained and socialized to
believe that their role in the adversarial system requires them to assist
their clients in making fundamental choices, not to make those choices
for them.34 The concept of lawyer-knows-best has been largely repudi-
ated and replaced by the principle of informed client decisionmaking.
30. It is important to note that in some cases raising competency will result in a quick
positive recovery for the client. It may also enable a mentally ill client with high bail to spend his
pretrial incarceration in a more desirable setting than jail. Thus, the conscientious lawyer may see
some real benefit in raising the issue for a particular client.
31. Fried's notion of the lawyer as a special-purpose friend accurately describes the man-
ner in which some lawyers relate to their clients. Fried, supra note 4. As a friend, the lawyer may be
tempted to take protective action. This may be particularly true of public defenders or legal ser-
vices lawyers with a strong ideological commitment to working with disadvantaged clients. More-
over, the client-centered advocacy model, supra note 19, with its emphasis on empathetic listening,
greater rapport, and heightened trust, serves to reinforce the natural sympathy and loyalty the
lawyer feels toward someone who has turned to her in a time of trouble. See also Wasserstrom,
supra note 4, at 22.
32. For a variety of reasons, clients will push their lawyer-, to make important decisions
for them. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 19, at 153; Chilar, Client Self-Determination:
Intervention or Interference?, 14 ST. Louis U.L.J. 604 (1970).
33. Prosecutors and judges, sometimes pressured by the defendant's family members,
will often call upon defense counsel to assist them to "help" the defendant. Defense counsel may
be encouraged to convince her client to plead guilty rather than force the prosecutor to try a weak
case because the client's best interest-mental treatment leading to a healthy mental state-will be
served by a guilty plea.
34. "The American lawyer's professional model is that of zeal: a lawyer is expected to
devote energy, intelligence, skill and personal commitment to the single goal of furthering the
client's interests as those are ultimately defined by the client." C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETH-
ics 578 (1986). This view is reflected in major textbooks used to teach criminal law. See, e.g., W. LA
FAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 24-25 (1985). Similarly, both Morris, supra note 19, at
782, and Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models: Preserving Client-
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The lawyer, therefore, may feel uncomfortable assuming a role that has
been widely criticized.3 5
This feeling is likely to be exacerbated by the lawyer's own sense of
uncertainty as to what constitutes the client's best interest. Many deci-
sions a criminal defendant must make involve close calls or tough
choices among unattractive alternatives. Unsure of the decision she
would make in a particular situation and aware that this decision would
ultimately turn on her own value system, the lawyer may want to avoid
making fundamental decisions for her client.
The lawyer may feel bound, therefore, to raise competency to pro-
tect the client's right to make fundamental decisions even though rais-
ing the issue is detrimental to the client. Counsel may also be uncom-
fortable withholding information from the court about the client's
impaired mental condition. Aware of her role as an officer of the court
and concerned about not misleading the court, counsel may seriously
question the propriety of allowing her marginally competent client to
act, such as pleading guilty, when the competency issue remains
unresolved.3 6
Given the difficulties with each role, it is not surprising that crimi-
nal defense lawyers do not have a settled, clear understanding of their
role when representing a mentally impaired defendant. This role confu-
sion also stems from a lack of training; law schools devote little atten-
tion to the representation of the mentally ill. 37 For many lawyers, their
limited exposure to the mentally impaired defendant provides negligi-
ble opportunity to develop a well-defined role. The criminal practi-
tioner is also unlikely to receive satisfactory answers from fellow law-
yers since they too share this role confusion. Thus, the criminal
practitioner may turn to the norms of the profession for guidance.38
Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811,819 (1987), acknowledge the
widespread acceptance of the model of client-centered advocacy in clinical education.
35. See Tremblay, supra note 15, at 521-22; Wasserstrom, supra note 4, at 19. See gener-
ally Spiegel, supra note 12; D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 19; Ellmann, supra note 19;
Blumberg, supra note 2; Luban, supra note 21. As most of these commentators point out, however,
many lawyers continue to dominate the lawyer-client relationship and either make decisions or
manipulate their clients' choices.
36. Paul Chernoff and William Schaffer, supra note 5, at 519, raise the question of
whether defense counsel's failure to alert the trial court to the client's possible incompetence could
constitute a fraud upon the court. See also Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA Stan-
dards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 375, 383-84 (1985) (sug-
gesting, without authority or argument, that Model Code provisions EC 7-25 and DR 7-102 re-
quire defense counsel's disclosure). But see infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text.
37. The Legal Assistance to Institutionalized Persons program at the University of Wis-
consin Law School, a clinical program providing students the opportunity to work with mentally
ill clients, represents a notable exception.
38. Undoubtedly, some lawyers muddle along making hard decisions without really
thinking about their role or ethical responsibilities. In my experience, however, many lawyers do
look to the ethics code and professional standards in an effort to behave in a professionally correct
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Although the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) recognizes that a lawyer's responsibilities may vary according to
the intelligence or mental condition of a client,39 it offers no real answer
to the question of the proper role of the criminal practitioner with a
mentally impaired client. The lawyer is directed to obtain all possible
aid from the client, to consider all circumstances, and to safeguard and
advance the client's interests.4 ° Moreover, where the impaired client
has no guardian, the lawyer may be compelled to make decisions on the
client's behalf.4 1 It js unclear, however, which, if any, decisions those
might be since Model Code provision EC 7-12 also warns that "a law-
yer cannot perform any act or make any decision which the law requires
his client to perform or make. ,42
The new Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) of-
fer somewhat more direction. When a client's ability to make "ade-
quately considered decisions" is impaired, the lawyer "shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with
the client."'43 As the comment to Model Rule 1.14 observes, a client
lacking legal competence often retains the ability to understand, weigh
options, and reach conclusions about matters affecting his well-being.44
The drafters of this Rule also acknowledge that there are degrees of
competence which render some impaired clients capable of making
some decisions but not others.45 Accordingly, the lawyer is directed to
treat the mentally disabled client with respect and to allow the client as
much autonomy as possible. Nevertheless, some seriously impaired cli-
ents are simply incapable of making any decision. Hence, the lawyer is
permitted to take "protective... action ... when the lawyer reasonably
believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest.",46
This broad principle leaves the criminal defense lawyer without
much guidance. Is it appropriate protective action for a lawyer to raise
competency over the client's objection? Is it proper for the lawyer to
override the strategically unwise decision of a mentally impaired client
who wants to testify? Or is entering a guilty plea in a misdemeanor case
for a marginally competent defendant to secure a client's immediate
release from custody the sort of protective action contemplated by this
way. This is particularly so when the lawyer is unable to get guidance from other, more experi-
enced lawyers.
39. MODEL CODE EC 7-11.
40. MODEL CODE EC 7-12.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. MODEL RULE 1.14.
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Rule? Model Rule 1.14 does not provide clear answers to these difficult
questions.
The comment to Model Rule 1.14, however, does discuss briefly
the issue that is at the core of the Johnson decision: whether a criminal
defense lawyer is obligated to disclose her belief that a client is mentally
disabled when that disclosure can adversely affect the client's interests.
The drafters do not provide an answer; rather, they conclude that "the
lawyer's position in such cases is an unavoidably difficult one." 4 7 The
comment ends by suggesting that the lawyer "may seek guidance from
an appropriate diagnostician." 4 It is difficult to understand how a di-
agnostician is going to provide guidance to the lawyer struggling with
what is a tough legal decision. The suggestion is particularly unhelpful
since the decision is inextricably tied to normative questions about the
proper role of a lawyer, which the lawyer, not the diagnostician, must
address. The ethics codes leave the criminal practitioner stuck in this
"unavoidably difficult" position.
Prior to 1984, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice did not help
the lawyer caught in this position. Indeed, the Standards did not even
mention any special responsibilities or additional duties for counsel
when representing a mentally impaired criminal defendant. Similarly,
commentators paid limited attention to the ethical difficulties facing
criminal defense lawyers with mentally ill clients.49 Such representation
admittedly posed "particularly thorny ethical problems," 5 but the
criminal practitioner largely was left to hack through the thorns by
herself.5
The criminal lawyer no longer hacks unguided. In August 1984,
the ABA approved a major addition to the Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice when it adopted the Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards.52
The new Standards include a lengthy section on competency to stand
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Golten, Role of Defense Counsel in the Criminal Commitment Process, 10 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 385 (1972), and Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 5, represent two significant exceptions.
50. J. BURKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-24.
51. One excellent exception which provides considerable guidance to the criminal de-
fense lawyer is A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES (1984). Am-
sterdam identifies a number of factors that defense counsel should weigh in deciding whether to
raise competency in a particular case. He does not discuss or acknowledge any duty on defense
counsel's part to raise competency. Rather, counsel is urged to balance the costs and benefits to the
client of raising the issue before reaching a decision. See also supra note 49.
52. The Mental Health Standards were added as Chapter 7 of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice. This Chapter contains 96 standards and is broken into 10 parts. For a discussion
of the development of this Chapter, see ABA STANDARDS at 7-xiv to 7-xx.
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trial.53 Standard 7-4.2 bears special attention because it directly ad-
dresses the question of defense counsel's role in raising competency.
Standard 7-4.2 requires defense counsel to raise competency when-
ever counsel has a good faith doubt about her client's competency. The
commentary to Standard 7-4.2 recognizes that defense counsel's duty to
represent effectively a client's best interest may conflict with her obliga-
tions to the court.54 Standard 7-4.2 resolves this conflict in favor of the
court by mandating that defense counsel disclose doubts about a defen-
dant's mental condition regardless of the client's wishes or apparent
best interests. 55 Before exploring this Standard and the implications of
this new duty, however, a closer look at defense counsel's difficult posi-
tion is warranted.
III. State v. Johnson
In November 1982, the State of Wisconsin charged Oliver Johnson
with the murder of Debra White. David Kagan-Kans, an experienced
staff attorney with -the Milwaukee office of the State Public Defender,
was assigned to represent Johnson.56 Kagan-Kans went immediately to
the Milwaukee County Jail to interview his client. Based on his obser-
vations of the defendant's mental state57 and the brutal details of the
murder as described in the criminal complaint, Kagan-Kans promptly
retained Dr. Kenneth Smail, a clinical psychologist.5 " Kagan-Kans
asked Smail to evaluate Johnson's mental condition and to advise him
regarding the viability of an insanity defense.59 Aware of Johnson's
service in Vietnam and the grisly nature of the murder, Kagan-Kans
53. ABA STANDARDS 7-4.1 to 7-4.15. Chapter 7 also includes a section entitled Compe-
tence on Other Issues, ABA Standards 7-5.1 to 7-5.4.
54. ABA STANDARDS at 7-179.
55. Id. at 7-181. See also supra note 8.
56. Kagan-Kans had been an assistant district attorney, a supervisor in a clinical pro-
gram at the University of Wisconsin Law School and a private practitioner before becoming a
public defender. As of July 1983, he had handled well over 100 felony cases. At least a dozen of
these cases involved a competency issue. See Record of Post-Conviction Hearing, State v. John-
son, No. K-4803 at 64-65 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Aug. 15, 1984) [hereinafter Record].
Kagan-Kans, an active member of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
became the Chief Staff Attorney of the Milwaukee Public Defender office in 1984.
57. Kagan-Kans testified that Oliver Johnson "appeared quiet, depressed, somewhat
confused" during their initial interview. See Record, supra note 56, at 66 (No. K-4803).
58. Dr. Smail had been employed since April 1980 at the Forensics Unit of the Milwau-
kee County Medical Health Complex. He regularly performed court-ordered competency evalua-
tions as well as examinations on the insanity issue. At the time he evaluated Johnson, Dr. Smail
had evaluated approximately 300 individuals and had testified in court between 50 and 75 times.
Brief of Respondent at 15, State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 207, 395 N.W.2d 176 (1986) (No. 84-
2143-CR).
59. See Record, supra note 56, at 67-68 (No. K-4803).
1988:65
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was particularly interested in Smail's opinion as to whether Johnson
was suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.6"
Having represented numerous defendants with mental health
problems, Kagan-Kans was very familiar with Wisconsin law on com-
petency and insanity.61 Competency focuses on the defendant's present
mental state whereas the insanity defense turns on the defendant's
mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense. 62 John-
son did exhibit some mental illness, but Kagan-Kans felt he could com-
municate with Johnson and that Johnson understood his legal predica-
ment. Thus, Kagan-Kans had no initial concern about his client's
competency to proceed.
Given the seriousness of the charge facing his client and the lack of
other possible defenses, Kagan-Kans realized that insanity was a de-
fense that had to be fully explored. He further understood the value and
importance of a prompt evaluation. 63 Accordingly, Kagan-Kans ar-
ranged to have Dr. William Crowley, a psychiatrist and the head of the
60. The American Psychiatric Association defines the post-traumatic stress disorder as
an "adjusted disorder with anxious mood" based on the following criteria:
A. Existence of a recognizable stressor that would evoke significant symptoms of
distress in almost anyone.
B. Re-experiencing of the trauma as evidenced by at least one of the following:
(I) recurrent and intrusive recollection of the event.
(2) recurrent dreams of the event.
(3) sudden acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring, because
of an association with an environmental or ideational stimulus.
C. Numbing of responsiveness to or reduced involvement with the external world,
beginning some time after the trauma, as shown by at least one of the following:
(1) markedly diminished interest in one or more significant activities.
(2) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others.
(3) constricted affect.
D. At least two of the following symptoms that were not present before the
trauma:
(I) hyperalterness or exaggerated startle response.
(2) sleep disturbance.
(3) guilt about surviving when others have not, or about behavior required
for survival.
(4) memory impairment or trouble concentrating.
(5) avoidance of activities that arouse recollection of the traumatic event.
(6) intensification of symptoms by exposure to events that symbolize or re-
semble the traumatic event.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
249-51 (3d ed. 1987).
61. See supra note 56.
62. In Wisconsin, a defendant is not responsible for criminal conduct "if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacked substantial capacity either to appreci-
ate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law." WIs.
STAT. § 971.15(I) (1985-1986). This was the definition of insanity at the time of the Johnson case.
63. See Record, supra note 56, at 67, 72 (No. K-4803). See also A. AMSTERDAM, supra
note 51, at 203, 207 (recommending a prompt psychiatric evaluation but preferably by an expert
retained by the defense). For a general discussion of the importance of defense access to a mental
evaluation of the defendant, see ABA STANDARD 7-3.3 and commentary.
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Forensic Unit of the Milwaukee County Mental Health Complex, ex-
amine Johnson. He also retained three other experts specializing in
post-traumatic stress disorders to assist in Johnson's defense.64 After
consulting with all of these experts, however, Kagan-Kans determined
that there was no basis for raising an insanity plea.
Kagan-Kans's strategy now focused on challenging the prosecu-
tion's proof that Johnson intended to kill White.65 Kagan-Kans de-
vised a two-pronged attack. First, he would argue that Johnson was
suffering from a dissociative reaction that precluded the defendant
from forming the specific intent to kill. Second, he would claim that
Johnson had acted in the heat of passion, which again negated the
defendant's specific intent to kill. Kagan-Kans's plan envisioned con-
ceding that Johnson killed White. His goal, however, was to convince
the trial judge to give lesser included instructions and persuade the jury
that Johnson was guilty of manslaughter, or possibly second degree
murder, but not first degree murder.6 6
In the month before trial, Kagan-Kans found it increasingly diffi-
cult to discuss case strategy rationally with Johnson. Nothing in the
record suggests that Kagan-Kans or any of his experts had any doubts
about Johnson's competency prior to Kagan-Kans's disagreements
with Johnson over case strategy. To Kagan-Kans, the strength of the
State's evidence left the defense no viable approach other than arguing
that Johnson lacked the requisite intent to commit first degree mur-
der.67 Despite repeated efforts, however, Kagan-Kans was unable to
convince Johnson of the wisdom of his proposed defense.68 During
their discussions, Johnson's thinking became increasingly delusional.
Rather than focusing on the State's evidence against him, Johnson fix-
ated on irrelevant details while insisting that inadmissible, irrelevant
64. The additional experts were Dr. Sheldon Chicks, Dr. Tom Williams and Dr. John
Janos. See Record, supra note 56, at 96 (No. K-4803).
65. See If Wis. Jury Instructions-Criminal 1100 (1980), which provides in part:
Before the defendant may be found guilty of murder in the first degree, the State
must prove by evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that there were
present the following two elements of this offense:
First, that the defendant intended to kill. . . .Second, that the defendant
caused the death of....
Under the Criminal Code, the phrase "intent to kill" means the mental pur-
pose to take the life of another human being. This intent to kill is the element of this
offense that distinguishes it from all other degrees of murder.
66. See Record, supra note 56, at 68-69, 94-95 (No. K-4803).
67. Id. at 92, 93. Johnson gave two detailed confessions in which he admitted stabbing
White. His confessions were corroborated by three citizen eyewitnesses who saw Johnson knock
White down and then repeatedly stab her. Complaint, State v. Johnson, No. K-4803 (Wis. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 22, 1982).
68. The record shows that Kagan-Kans met betw~en 20 and 25 times with Johnson and
on several other occasions with his client and one of the experts to discuss the case. See Record,
supra note 56, at 70, 73, 76, 80, 92 (No. K-4803).
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evidence would vindicate him. He was unwilling at times even to con-
cede that White was actually dead.69
Up to this point, Kagan-Kans had sought to maintain a normal
lawyer-client relationship and to play his usual role, that of zealous ad-
vocate. He had diligently evaluated and investigated all possible de-
fenses in the case. He finally focused on a defense which, in his profes-
sional judgment, provided the only possible means of securing a
favorable outcome for his client. Johnson wanted a trial and clearly did
not want to be convicted of first degree murder. Yet, for reasons that
appeared contradictory and irrational, Johnson refused to go along
with Kagan-Kans's proposed strategy."0
Kagan-Kans was in an unavoidably difficult position, uncertain of
his role. He felt that defending the case as Johnson wanted-arguing
that the defendant never killed White or that he acted in self-defense-
was tantamount to pleading guilty. His loyalty to Johnson, his desire to
minimize harm to his client, his desire to put the State to its proof, and
his own perception of his role as a lawyer pushed Kagan-Kans to resist
respecting Johnson's choice. Moreover, Johnson's choice of defense
conflicted with Johnson's desire to avoid conviction and thereby rein-
forced Kagan-Kans's decision not to honor Johnson's choice.
Nonetheless, Kagan-Kans was reluctant simply to decide himself
which defense to pursue. The amount of time he spent trying to per-
suade Johnson to follow his proposed defense evinces Kagan-Kans's
commitment to the principle of informed client decisionmaking. Ka-
gan-Kans realized the importance of the decision whether to submit
jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of second degree mur-
der and manslaughter. He was unsure, however, whether this decision
ultimately rested with the client."'
69. Id. at 78.
70. Id. at 80, 91-94. See also infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
71. See Record, supra note 56, at 81, 82 (No. K-4803). In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745
(1983), Chief Justice Burger indicated that, with the exception of the three fundamental decisions
set forth in ABA Standard 4-5.2, all other decisions are for counsel. Id. at 751. Arguably, therefore,
the lesser included decision is a strategic or tactical decision within the exclusive province of de-
fense counsel. In fact, in State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983), the court found
an attorney ineffective for failing to inform himself about and then investigate a lesser included
defense. The Felton court implied that the decision to pursue this lesser included defense was coun-
sel's. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d at 505-07, 329 N.W.2d at 170-71. See also State v. Green, 38 Wis. 2d 361,
156 N.W.2d 477 (1968) (holding that a defendant is bound by defense counsel's decision to waive a
lesser included instruction). On the other hand, the commentary to Standard 4-5.2 indicates that
the client ultimately should decide a lesser included instruction issue. "Indeed, because this deci-
sion is so important as well as so similar to the defendant's decision about the charges to which to
plead, the defendant should be the one to decide whether to seek submission to the jury of lesser
included offenses." ABA STANDARDS at 4-68. No authority, however, is provided in support of this
proposition. See also III Wis. Jury Instructions-Criminal, SM6 (1980), which indicates that the
lesser included decision should be the client's. Given the opportunity to make an informed, reflec-
tive decision and the importance of the decision to the client, the lesser included instruction deci-
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If it were Johnson's choice to request lesser included jury instruc-
tions, Johnson's irrationality would interfere with Kagan-Kans's abil-
ity to present a defense. If Johnson chose not to pursue the only possi-
ble defense available, Kagan-Kans felt Johnson would no longer be
assisting in his own defense-he would be thwarting it. Johnson's in-
ability to make a rational choice involving a fundamental case decision
would require Kagan-Kans to raise Johnson's competency.72 However,
if the decision to request lesser included instructions was the lawyer's to
make, Kagan-Kans could simply take whatever step he deemed consist-
ent with Johnson's best legal interest. Raising competency would be
unnecessary. To Kagan-Kans, therefore, the question of Johnson's
competency was inextricably linked to the resolution of the lesser in-
cluded instruction decision.73
Prior to making any decision, Kagan-Kans met with Dr. Crowley
and Johnson on July 5, 1983 and with Dr. Smail and the defendant on
the following day to discuss Johnson's options at trial. Following these
meetings, each doctor wrote to Kagan-Kans expressing concern about
Johnson's competency.74 For each doctor, Johnson's unwillingness to
appreciate and accept the strategic course Kagan-Kans had mapped
out suggested that the defendant's mental condition was sufficiently im-
paired so that he no longer could assist counsel.75 The doctors agreed,
sion is a "fundamental" decision that ought to rest with the client. See also Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806 (1975). A full exploration of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
72. See Record, supra note 56, at 82, 92 (No. K-4803). Kagan-Kans also stated that if
Johnson refused to testify, he would have viewed that decision as disastrous and tantamount to
pleading guilty. Given Johnson's desire to fight the charge and in light of the State's case, the
defense case, the doctors' opinions and his own observations, Kagan-Kans would have raised
competency rather than respect Johnson's decision not to testify. Id. at 92, 93.
73. Id. at 82, 86.
74. Dr. Smail wrote to Kagan-Kans on July 7, 1983. He concluded that Johnson's
"thinking impinges on his ability to rationally aid in the preparation of his defense in an adver-
sarial setting." This conclusion was based on Johnson's paranoid delusions about the facts and the
strength of the State's case; his attention to marginal details rather than important matters; his
unwillingness to accept the fact of the victim's death; and his threat not to participate in the trial.
Brief and Appendix for Respondent at 101, State v. Johnson, 126 Wis. 2d 8, 374 N.W.2d 637 (Ct.
App. 1985) (No. 84-2143-CR) [hereinafter Brief and Appendix for Respondent]. Dr. Crowley
agreed with Smail in a letter dated July 11, 1983. He advised Kagan-Kans that he had "serious
doubts about his [Johnson's] competency to stand trial." Dr. Crowley's opinion was based on
Johnson's inability to focus on the State's evidence and a fixation on irrelevant matters; his insis-
tence on controlling the evidence presented by the State; and an unwillingness to participate at trial
if his concerns were not addressed. Crowley described Johnson as "virtually impervious to rea-
son." Brief and Appendix for Respondent, supra, at 102-03 (No. 84-2143-CR). Neither doctor
gave a definitive opinion regarding Johnson's competency because both were employed by the
Milwaukee County Forensic Unit, the agency responsible for conducting court-ordered compe-
tency evaluations. State v. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d 212, 395 N.W.2d 179 (1986).
75. See Record, supra note 56; at 82-83, 101 (No. K-4803). Neither doctor expressed
concerns about Johnson's ability to understand the proceedings against him. Rather, each focused
on the defendant's capacity to assist counsel. See Brief and Appendix for Respondent, supra note
74, at 101-03 (No. 84-2143-CR).
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however, that Johnson's impairment was significant only if the lesser
included instruction decision was his to make. 76 The doctors' reasoning
mirrored that of Kagan-Kans: there was only one viable defense, and
Johnson's mental condition apparently precluded him from appreciat-
ing that fact. Thus, if it were Johnson's choice whether to request lesser
included instructions, then, before respecting Johnson's irrational deci-
sion to frustrate his own defense, Kagan-Kans would have to raise the
issue of his client's competency.
Failing to find clear authority on the lesser included jury instruc-
tion question, Kagan-Kans still hesitated to raise the issue of Johnson's
competency. He was reluctant because doing so would trigger an inpa-
tient psychiatric evaluation that would give the State's experts an op-
portunity to examine Johnson.77 Kagan-Kans was concerned that this
evaluation would enable the prosecution to blunt the proposed testi-
mony of his experts.78 Since it was strategically unwise to raise compe-
tency, Kagan-Kans as zealous advocate did not want to pursue this
course unless he had no other alternative. Instead, he approached the
trial judge and requested an ex parte hearing to secure the judge's opin-
ion on the lesser included instruction decision.79 When the judge indi-
cated that he felt such a decision was for defense counsel to make, Ka-
gan-Kans no longer felt it necessary to raise competency."0 Although
Johnson was mentally impaired, his mental impairment did not materi-
ally affect Johnson's ability to assist counsel, prevent Johnson from un-
derstanding the nature of the proceedings against him, or interfere with
Kagan-Kans's ability to prepare a defense. In Kagan-Kans's opinion,
an opinion supported by his experts, Johnson was competent.
Thus,' at a pretrial hearing shortly before trial, Kagan-Kans chose
not to raise the competency issue despite the trial judge's direct question
concerning Johnson's competency. Kagan-Kans fully discussed raising
76. See Record, supra note 56, at 82, 89, 93 (No. K-4803).
77. See id. at 86-89. Although section 971.14(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes provides for
both inpatient and outpatient evaluations, Johnson's high bail would have dictated an inpatient
evaluation. Given Crowley's and Smail's involvement in the case, Johnson would have been sent to
Winnebago State Hospital for an examination. See also A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 51, at 203-09
(warning of the dangers of permitting the state's experts to examine the defendant); Chernoff &
Schaffer, supra note 5, at 509-10 (describing the lack of impartiality and pro-prosecution bias of
experts in state institutions).
78. See Record, supra note 56, at 86 (No. K-4803). Kagan-Kans also expressed concern
about not violating the attorney-client privilege if it were not necessary to do so. Id. at 90.
79. Since the prosecutor was fully aware of the nature of this ex parte hearing, it was not
violative of the prohibitions of Model Code provision DR 7-110(B). See Record, Ex Parte Pro-
ceedings in State v. Johnson, No. K-4803 at 1 (July 12, 1983). It appears that Kagan-Kans was
attempting to carry out the command of ABA Standard 4-5.2(c) which recommends that defense
counsel make a record of any significant disagreement between lawyer and client on a matter of
strategy. The Standard also states that the record should be made in a manner protective of
confidentiality.
80. See Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 215, 395 N.W.2d at 180.
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the issue with Johnson who agreed that the issue should not be raised.8'
The trial proceeded as scheduled and Kagan-Kans pursued his in-
tended strategy. The trial court gave a lesser included instruction on
second degree murder but refused to instruct the jury on manslaugh-
ter. 2 The jury rejected the defense theory and convicted Johnson of
first degree murder.
IV. THE Johnson DECISION AND ABA STANDARD 7-4.2:
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO RAISE COMPETENCY
In post-conviction motions, Johnson's appellate counsel claimed
that Kagan-Kans provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to
raise the competency issue. The trial court, the court of appeals, and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court83 all agreed. Applying the two-prong test set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 4 the supreme court found that Ka-
gan-Kans's performance was deficient and that this deficient perform-
ance prejudiced Johnson's defense. The court concluded, therefore,
that Johnson was denied his sixth amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. 85
In reviewing the facts of the case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
focused on the letters from Dr. Crowley and Dr. Smail. The court held
that these letters gave, or should have given, Kagan-Kans a reason to
doubt Johnson's competency.8 6 Yet, despite the trial court's explicit
inquiry about Johnson's competency, Kagan-Kans neither raised com-
petency nor disclosed the existence of the Crowley and Smail letters.
The court questioned whether Kagan-Kans's failure to raise com-
petency in light of these letters constituted representation below an ob-
jective standard of reasonableness. The answer, according to the court,
81. At the ex parte hearing, the trial court asked Kagan-Kans and Johnson whether the
defense intended to raise the competency issue. Johnson acknowledged discussing the issue with
defense counsel and stated he did not want competency raised. Brief for Appellant at 6, State v.
Johnson, 126 Wis. 2d 8, 374 N.W.2d 637 (Ct. App. 1985) (No. 84-2143-CR) [hereinafter Brief for
Appellant].
82. Brief for Appellant, supra note 81, at 8 (No. 84-2143-CR). Kagan-Kans sought to
introduce testimony from Crowley and Smail concerning Johnson's mental condition at the time
of the offense in support of this manslaughter theory. The trial court barred the testimony citing
Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980) (expert testimony on the defendant's capacity
to form intent to kill is excludable from the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial). Nonetheless, Kagan-
Kans's reliance on State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983), to introduce expert
testimony appears warranted. Not only does Felton seemingly permit such testimony, counsel's
failure in Felton to adduce expert testimony or raise a heat of passion manslaughter defense consti-
tuted ineffective assistance. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d at 510-14, 329 N.W.2d at 173-74.
83. See Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 211, 221, 395 N.W.2d at 179, 183.
84. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
show that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial to the defense).
85. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 211, 221, 395 N.W.2d at 179, 183.
86. Id. at 220, 395 N.W.2d at 182-83.
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turned on the point at which defense counsel is required to raise compe-
tency. Although it acknowledged that the Wisconsin Statutes do not
spell out if or when defense counsel must act,8 7 the court observed that
other courts have found that counsel must bring competency to the trial
court's attention whenever there is "reasonable" or "substantial
doubt" about the defendant's competency.88 The court reasoned that
the protection afforded the incompetent defendant is illusory if neither
the trial court nor defense counsel uses the statutory procedures regard-
ing competency. In the court's view, the letters from Smail and Crowley
constituted reliable evidence creating a reason to doubt Johnson's com-
petency to stand trial. By failing to bring these letters to the trial court's
attention, thereby enabling the court to ensure that Johnson was indeed
competent, Kagan-Kans performed deficiently.
Turning to the second prong of the Strickland test, the court ques-
tioned whether Kagan-Kans's deficient performance cast doubt on the
reliability of the trial. An incompetent defendant, the court noted,
should not be subject to trial. 89 Since Kagan-Kans failed to alert the
trial court to evidence raising a doubt about Johnson's competency, the
court never reached the question of the need for a competency hearing.
Hence, Kagan-Kans's failure was particularly serious because it caused
Johnson to be subjected to a trial even though he may have been incom-
petent. The court concluded that Johnson was denied his right to a fair
trial and remanded the case to the trial court for a competency
hearing.9"
The Johnson decision marked the first time that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized that defense counsel has an affirmative duty
to raise the competency issue. Therefore, it is surprising that Kagan-
87. Section 971.14(1) of the Wisconsin Statutes indicates that the court should proceed
under this section whenever there is a reason to doubt a defendant's competency, but it is silent as
to if or when counsel must act. The drafting notes to this provision suggest that when neither party
moves for a competency inquiry, the court may be required to do so where the evidence raises a
sufficient doubt. See Judicial Council Committee's Note to Wis. STAT. § 971.14 (1981).
88. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 219, 395 N.W.2d. at 182. The court relied on three federal
cases to support its decision: Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1967) (an incompetent defen-
dant cannot waive the right to stand trial nor may counsel do it for him by failing to move for a
competency hearing when there was reasonable doubt about defendant's competence); Owsley v.
Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1966) (a defendant is deprived of right to effective assistance of
counsel when lawyer fails to present evidence showing doubt about defendant's competency); and
Speedy v. Wyrick, 702 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1983) (counsel's failure to request competency hearing
when evidence raises substantial doubt about defendant's competency may be ineffective assis-
tance of counsel).
89. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 223, 395 N.W.2d at 184. The court looked to Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975) for this proposition.
90. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 224, 226, 395 N.W.2d at 184, 185. On remand, the trial court
held a hearing to determine the defendant's competency at the time of trial. The court determined
that Johnson had been competent and upheld his conviction. State v. Johnson, No. K-4803 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 1987).
HeinOnline  -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 84 1988
Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?
Kans's performance should be deemed "outside the wide range of pro-
fessionally competent assistance," especially in view of the strong pre-
sumption usually accorded counsel's professional judgments.9' It is dif-
ficult to fault Kagan-Kans for failing to anticipate a duty not found in
the Wisconsin Statutes or case law nor recognized at the time in the
ABA Standards or any of the leading defense texts. In fact, his analysis
of the issue and tactical decision not to raise competency represented
the carefully thought out, individualized approach suggested in the
Trial Manual for the Defense of Criminal Cases.92
Moreover, there was authority supporting Kagan-Kans's deci-
sion. 93 The Johnson court acknowledged that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held, in Enriquez v. Procunier,9 4
that defense counsel could, for tactical reasons, decide not to raise the
competency issue. The Enriquez court had concluded that a measure of
investigation followed by a reasonable tactical decision did not consti-
tute deficient representation. 95 Kagan-Kans thoroughly investigated
Johnson's defenses, including the question of competency. Moreover,
his decision not to raise competency was reasonable in view of his pro-
posed defense and his resolution of the lesser included instruction issue.
Nonetheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court summarily declined to fol-
low Enriquez, stating that "considerations of strategy are inappropriate
in mental competency situations."-
96
The court offered no explanation, marshalled no arguments, and
cited no authority for this conclusion. Early in its opinion, the court did
cite three federal cases holding that defense counsel must bring the
competency issue to the trial court's attention when counsel has a rea-
91. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 217, 395 N.W.2d at 181. In Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984), the Court stressed that a lawyer's judgment should not be second-guessed as long
as it falls within the sphere of professional reasonableness. Id. at 689. Since most commentators at
the time agreed that a defense lawyer should raise competency only if it were in the client's best
interest, Kagan-Kans's performance hardly seems unreasonable. See, e.g., Golten, supra note 49,
at 389; Eizenstat, Mental Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 379, 383-84
(1969); Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 HARV. L. REV. 454,467 (1967). It is particularly hard
to characterize Kagan-Kans's thoughtful and vigorous representation as outside the bounds of
professionally competent work when it is compared with other representation deemed acceptable
under the Strickland standard. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114 (1987), reh'g denied, 108
S. Ct. 32 (1987); see also Mitchell v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3249 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari to review habeas corpus proceeding), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 14 (1987) (denying
certiorari to review denial of stay of execution).
92. See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 51, at 1-203 to 1-204.
93. See O'Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd on other
grounds, 302 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (defense counsel under no duty to request a mental exami-
nation or raise an insanity defense for a defendant of questionable competency when to do so is
not in the defendant's best interests).
94. 752 F.2d II1 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1126 (1985).
95. Enriquez, 752 F.2d at 114.
96. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 221, 395 N.W.2d at 183.
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sonable or substantial doubt about the defendant's competency. Yet
the three cases relied on by the court in imposing this duty on defense
counsel all involved instances in which defense counsel failed to ade-
quately explore or investigate the issue of the defendant's mental state
despite obvious indications of mental illness.97 Unlike the Johnson case,
none of these cases involved a considered decision by defense counsel
not to raise competency. The cases instead stand for the proposition
that defense counsel's unexplained failure to explore competency when
circumstances clearly warrant action constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel. These cases, however, simply do not address the issues
raised in Johnson.
The Johnson decision also mentioned but neglected to discuss Ka-
gan-Kans's primary reason for not raising competency: his belief that
Johnson's impairment did not affect Johnson's ability to assist in his
own defense because the lesser included instruction decision was for
counsel, not Johnson, to make.9" The opinion did not suggest that Ka-
gan-Kans and the trial court were correct in concluding that the deci-
sion on the submission of a lesser included instruction is for the lawyer.
Nor, however, did the opinion reject that conclusion. The court simply
ignored the issue, leaving the practitioner without any guidance on this
troublesome question.
In addition, the court failed to address Kagan-Kans's proposition
that the competency issue is affected by the allocation of decision-
making between the lawyer and client. Again, the opinion did not spe-
97. See supra note 88. In Speedy, the court observed that the trial lawyer appeared to be
acutely aware of the defendant's incompetence and yet unaware of the legal possibility of a compe-
tency hearing. Speedy v. Wyrick, 702 F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1019
(1985). In Kibert, the defense lawyer, retained only ten days earlier, allowed the defendant to plead
guilty to two life sentences "solely on the basis of a mere nod of the prisoner's head when asked if
he wanted such a plea entered on his behalf" despite serious questions about the defendant's
mental condition. Kibert v. Peyton, 383 F.2d 566, 568 (4th Cir. 1967). In its initial decision, Owsley
v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 804 (4th Cir. 1965), the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court erred in refusing
to grant a hearing on incompetency or pay for a private psychiatric examination despite counsel's
motion and presentation of evidence regarding incompetency. In its second decision, Owsley v.
Peyton, 368 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1966), the court found that the competency hearing it had ordered
revealed reasonable grounds for doubting the defendant's competency at the time of trial. Accord-
ingly, the trial court should have granted the lawyer's motion. The lawyer was not ineffective
because he did not move for a hearing, but because he failed to adduce other proof which was
available. As in the Speedy and Kibert decisions, there was no indication in Owsley of any reasoned
decisionmaking by defense counsel, only an absence of zealous representation.
98. Johnson, 133 Wis. 2d at 214-15, 395 N.W.2d at 180. The court also summarily af-
firmed the trial court's decision to bar expert testimony on the intent issue, stating that the exclu-
sion was consistent with the principles of Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 97-98, 294 N.W.2d 2, 13-14
(1980) (expert opinion testimony on a defendant's ability to form requisite criminal intent is ex-
cluded from the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial). But see supra note 82; ABA STANDARDS at 7-121
(vast majority of courts hold that expert testimony on defendant's state of mind is admissible even
if the defendant has not raised an insanity defense as long as the crime charged requires proof of
specific intent).
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cifically reject Kagan-Kans's reasoning; it just sidestepped it. The court
focused on Smail's and Crowley's letters as the evidence demonstrating
that Kagan-Kans had a reason to doubt Johnson's competency. The
court simply glossed over the fact that these experts questioned John-
son's competency because of his inability to rationally decide the lesser
included instruction issue.9 9 If the experts' concerns were immaterial
because the decision was not Johnson's to make, then how did John-
son's impairment affect his ability to assist counsel or understand the
proceedings? Johnson offers no answer.
Moreover, the court never indicated why Kagan-Kans's assess-
ment of Johnson's competency should be entitled to so little weight.
Defense counsel is in the best position to make informed, comparative
judgments about a particular client's understanding of the proceedings
against him. 'o Counsel is also in the best position to assess that client's
ability to make the decisions required of the client and to provide
whatever assistance counsel deems necessary. Yet the court, in finding
that there was reason to doubt the defendant's competency, completely
discounted Kagan-Kans's opinion that Johnson was in fact competent.
The Johnson court demands undue deference to the opinion of retained
experts. Competency is not merely a question of ascertaining the defen-
dant's mental condition.' It is defense counsel, not the psychiatrist,
who is best able to apply the legal standard of competency to the facts
of the defendant's case and to determine how the defendant's mental
99. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. As many commentators have noted,
competency determinations fluctuate depending on the differing demands placed on defendants in
different proceedings. Drob, Berger & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 89; Winick, supra note 17, at
974; Robey, Criteria for Competency to Stand Trial: A Checklist for Psychiatrists, 122 AM. J. PsY-
CHIATRY 616-23 (1965); Miller & Germain, The Specificity of Evaluations of Competency to Pro-
ceed, 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 333-44 (1986). Using the analysis suggested by Drob, Berger and
Weinstein, it is clear that if Kagan-Kans were correct on the lesser included decision issue, then
there would have been no basis for questioning Johnson's competency because Johnson's delu-
sional state did not affect any skill or function the defendant was required to perform. Drob,
Berger & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 91. The ABA Standards reflect this functional approach. "A
determination of competence or incompetence is functional in nature, context-dependent and
pragmatic in orientation .... ABA STANDARDS at 7-175.
100. Chernoff& Schaffer, supra note 5, at 517. See also United States v. David, 511 F.2d
355, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States ex rel Rivers v. Franzen, 692 F.2d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 1982);
United States ex rel Mireles v. Greer, 736 F.2d 1160, 1165-66 (7th Cir. 1984). But see Pizzi, Compe-
tency to Stand Trial in Federal Courts: Conceptual and Constitutional Problems, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.
21, 29 (1977), and Bishop v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 404, 724 P.2d 23 (1986), agreeing that
defense counsel is in the best position to assess the defendant's competency but arguing that be-
cause of this superior position, defense counsel's testimony should be required regardless of the
client's best interest.
101. ABA STANDARDS at 7-170 to 7-175. In State ex rel. Haskins v. Dodge County Court,
62 Wis. 2d 250, 214 N.W.2d 575 (1974), the court discussed the limited role that psychiatrists
should play in competency determinations. Relying heavily on Dr. Karl Menninger's work, the
court concluded that the lawyers and the judge are the best persons to decide "what is essentially a
legal question." Haskins, 62 Wis. 2d at 264-66, 214 N.W.2d at 582-83.
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condition affects the defendant's legal status.10 2 Defense counsel
should be free to disregard the opinions of counsel's retained experts
when counsel does not feel the client is legally incompetent.
An even more troubling aspect of the Johnson decision was the
court's failure to acknowledge the difficult ethical bind faced by the
criminal defense lawyer. Defense counsel must respect client confidenti-
ality and provide zealous representation while carrying out her respon-
sibilities as an officer of the court.'" 3 These different responsibilities
reflect different values that may clash in any given situation. The John-
son opinion provides no indication that the court balanced or weighed
these values or even recognized Kagan-Kans's conflicting responsibili-
ties. By obligating defense counsel to disclose client confidences even
though this disclosure may cause serious adverse consequences for her
client, the court forces the criminal defense lawyer to subordinate her
role as advocate to that of officer of the court. 104 In order to protect the
client's right to a fair trial, the lawyer must betray the client's confi-
dences even though both counsel and client agree that such action is
contrary to the client's best interest. The court inadequately explained
what values or interests are served by requiring counsel to play such a
role, yet its decision seriously undermines the value of confidentiality,
102. Although the Haskins opinion, supra note 101, refers to the judge and counsel as the
best persons, it is defense counsel who best knows the defendant's case. Thus, it is defense counsel
who is best able to decide, based in part on private communications and interactions with the
defendant, how the defendant's mental state affects his ability to assist in his own defense. See also
supra note 100.
103. See supra note 2. See also Chernoff& Schaffer, supra note 5, at 515. The interplay of
these three conflicting ethical duties places the criminal defense lawyer in a difficult "trilemma."
See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, ch. 3.
104. In a limited number of situations, courts have found that a criminal defense lawyer,
as an officer of the court, must divulge to the court adverse information regarding a client.
BURKOFF, supra note 3, at 6-49 to 6-60. See, e.g., Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218, 220-21 (E.D.
Mich. 1966) (critical information regarding a client's competency must be disclosed); Common-
wealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327, 1333-37 (Pa. 1986) (requiring disclosure of client's where-
abouts). Other courts have been wary of obligating defense counsel to temper her advocacy be-
cause of any duty as an officer of the court. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555
F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977) (lawyer may not volunteer unsubstantiated opinion that client is
committing perjury). For a brief look at the widely diverging views of a defense lawyer's responsi-
bilities as an officer of the court, compare Chief Justice Burger's view in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S.
157, 168 (1986) (emphasizing defense counsel's role as an officer of the court) with that of Justice
Brennan in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stressing that
counsel must function as an advocate as opposed to a friend of the court). See also Justice White in
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (defense lawyer's mission not to ascertain or present the truth); Justice Black in Von Moltke
v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948) (right to counsel demands undivided allegiance and service
devoted solely to the interests of the client); COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
ROSCOE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CON-
DUCT Preamble (1982) ("it is clear that the lawyer for a private party is and should be an officer of
the court only in the sense of serving a court as a zealous, partisan advocate of one side of the case
before it, and in the sense of having been licensed by a court to play that very role.").
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strains the lawyer-client relationship, and compromises the defense
lawyer's role as zealous advocate.
Unlike the Johnson opinion, the commentary to ABA Standard 7-
4.2 explicitly acknowledges defense counsel's difficult position. The
drafters freely admit that at times defense counsel correctly surmises
that raising competency is not in the client's best interest. 105 To protect
the client's interests, counsel will want to forego using a procedure that
potentially causes greater hardship and injustice to the defendant. Ar-
guably, therefore, the lawyer's duty to the court to protect the integrity
of criminal proceedings must yield to the lawyer's obligation to serve
her client.' °6
The commentary concludes, however, that the lawyer's duty to the
court is paramount and overrides counsel's obligations to her client. 107
At various points in the commentary, the drafters use slightly different
language to justify this result. Defense counsel's independent profes-
sional responsibility toward the court and the fair administration of
justice provide the initial justification. 108 Later in the commentary, the
drafters refer to the lawyer's duty to maintain the integrity of the judi-
cial process as the basis for this disclosure requirement.' 0 9 Addition-
ally, the drafters stress that this requirement also provides protection
for the incompetent defendant by ensuring that defense lawyers do not
deprive defendants of their personal rights to make fundamental case
decisions.
These justifications simply do not support converting defense
counsel into a friend of the court. There are numerous instances in
which defense counsel, as zealous advocate, can legitimately obstruct
the truth or frustrate the efficient administration ofjustice. "' Although
truth and efficient, fair results are important systemic goals, the law-
105. ABA STANDARDS at 7-179.
106. See Bennett, Competency to Stand Trial: A Callfor Reform, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE Sci. 569, 578 (1968). See also infra notes 110-42 and accompanying text.
107. ABA STANDARDS at 7-181.
108. Id. at 7-177.
109. Id. at 7-179 to 7-181. The commentary suggests that because incompetency cannot
be waived it is a violation of due process to permit an incompetent defendant to be tried. Defense
counsel's duty to maintain the integrity of judicial proceedings, therefore, requires that she advise
the court of the defendant's possible incompetence. The drafters cite to Model Rule 3.3(9)(1) (law-
yer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal) and a law
review article by William Pizzi, supra note 100, at 30, as the authority for this obligation. ABA
STANDARDS at 7-180.
110. "The procedural and legal system are supposedly designed to produce results based
on just laws fairly applied on the basis of accurate facts; but a lawyer's objective within that system
is to achieve a result favorable to the lawyer's client, possibly despite justice, the law, and the
facts." C. WOLFRAM, supra note 34, at 585. As David Mellinkoff observes, "a substantial part of
the major criticism of the lawyer-his presumed indifference to truth-is rooted in fundamental
misconception of the lawyer's mission. The lawyer does not exist to spread the word of truth and
goodness to the ends of the earth. Somewhat more limited, the lawyer's mission is the nonetheless
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yer's role in the adversary system generally permits her to-represent her
client zealously even at the expense of these systemic goals. It is not
enough to state in conclusory fashion that requiring defense counsel to
assume an officer-of-the-court role serves these systemic goals. Rather,
if defense counsel for a mentally impaired defendant is to play a differ-
ent, lesser role than zealous advocate, it should be incumbent on those
who wish to change counsel's role to provide the authority or to explain
the policy warranting such a change.
The commentary to ABA Standard 7-4.2, however, offers little au-
thority for its restricted view of defense counsel's role."' It suggests
that defense counsel's failure to disclose a doubt about her client's com-
petency constitutes a false statement of material fact." 2 Certainly
counsel, as an officer of the court, has a duty to avoid perpetrating a
fraud on the court. Yet, the ethics codes, acclaiming the virtues of the
adversary system and the principle of zealous partisanship, generally
permit a criminal defense lawyer to withhold information or even create
a misleading impression.' '3 The controversy surrounding the lawyer's
duty to divulge a client's perjury reflects the limited scope of the crimi-
nal defense lawyer's obligation to disclose a client's fraud and the im-
awesome task of trying to make a reality of equality before the law." D. MELLINKOFF, supra note 4,
at 272. See also infra note 113.
Ill. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
112. ABA STANDARDS at 7-180 (citing MODEL RULE 3.3(a)(1)). See also supra note 36.
113. For a discussion of the limited extent to which the ethics codes impose restraints
upon a defense lawyer's zealous advocacy, see C. WOLFRAM, supra note 34, at 588-89, 641, 650-51.
See also A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 51, at 2-327; M. FREEDMAN, supra note 3, at 79-80.
Most commentators agree with Justice White's oft-quoted description of defense counsel's
role:
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our
system assigns him a different mission.... Defense counsel need present nothing, even if
he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the prosecution's case.
If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage,
unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our interest in not convicting the
innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst
possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there
are some limits which defense counsel must observe, but more often than not, defense
counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he
thinks the witness is telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he
thinks is lying. In this respect, as part ofour modified adversary system and as part of the
duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance or require con-
duct which in many instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58, (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part). For examples of cases in which defense counsel's efforts may frustrate truth or efficiency, see
State v. Brown, 644 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982) (a lawyer may seek to cast blame on
a co-defendant regardless of the lawyer's personal belief in the co-defendant's guilt); People v.
White, 57 N.Y.2d 129, 440 N.E.2d 1310, 454 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1982) (defense counsel has no duty to
produce alibi witness even though earlier revelation would have benefited the efficient administra-
tion of justice).
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portance of the value of confidentiality." 4 While the Model Rules now
require disclosure of a client's intention to commit perjury, 115 it is a
major leap to equate nondisclosure of defense counsel's doubts about a
client's competence with fraud."1 6 Neither the Model Rules nor sound
policy supports such a leap.
Although the Johnson opinion did not even discuss confidentiality,
it is clear that a criminal defense lawyer such as Kagan-Kans often
forms his opinion of a client's competency largely as a result of private
communications with the client. The protection of the attorney-client
privilege is not limited only to the client's words but may include the
client's nonverbal communications." 7 A number of courts have held
that a lawyer can be compelled to testify regarding counsel's opinion of
a client's competency even though the lawyer's observations would in-
volve privileged client communications," 8 but the better reasoned po-
sition is that a lawyer's opinion about a client's competence or state of
mind is inextricably mixed with the client's private communications. I
Accordingly, the lawyer should not be forced to raise competency and
114. Under Model Code DR 7-102(B)(1) as amended in 1974, disclosure of a client's
fraud was prohibited if the lawyer knew of the fraud as a result of a privileged communication. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (extending this
principle of nondisclosure to a client's secrets). If client perjury were protected from disclosure
under the Model Code, a client's competency problems also would be protected, For a more de-
tailed discussion of the problems the perjury issue poses for the criminal defense lawyer, see Freed-
man, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977); Brazil, Unan-
ticipated Client Perjury and the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence and Constitutional Law, 44
Mo. L. REV. 601 (1979).
115. Under Model Rule 3.3(a), the lawyer must take remedial measures to rectify a situa-
tion where the lawyer "knows" of client deception before the court. See also Nix v. Whiteside, 475
U.S. 157 (1986) (lawyer did not provide ineffective assistance by refusing to allow his client to
commit perjury). But this disclosure requirement under Model Rule 3.3(a) stands in stark contrast
to the broad protection afforded the principle of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6. See C.
WOLFRAM, supra note 34, at 658-59, 670-72. The question still remains, however, whether failure to
disclose doubts constitutes perpetrating a fraud. Arguably, "fraud" should be narrowly construed.
Id., at 673. See also Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality:
Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332 (1976).
116. The drafters of Model Rule 1. 14 recognized that the disclosure of a client's disability
could adversely affect the client and thus concluded the lawyer is left in a difficult position. MODEL
RULE 1.14 comment. By leaving open the possibility that counsel could decline to bring out the
client's disability, Model Rule 1.14 clearly implies that nondisclosure is nonfraudulent.
117. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 34, at 257.
118. Id. at 258. See Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
849 (1979); Malinauskas v. United States, 505 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Kendrick,
331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964).
119. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 34, at 258. See Gunther v. United States, 230 F.2d 222
(D.C. Cir. 1956) (allowing government to call defense counsel to probe basis for opinion regarding
client's competence violates attorney-client privilege and defendant's right to counsel). For a simi-
lar holding extending the attorney-client privilege to a lawyer's impressions regarding the volunta-
riness of the defendant's confession gained during confidential conversations, see State v. Adams,
277 S.C. 115, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981). But see Pizzi, supra note 100, at 60-64.
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thereby disclose privileged matters unless that disclosure is consistent
with the client's interests or wishes.
Even assuming that the communications between Kagan-Kans
and Johnson were not privileged, the question of Kagan-Kans's re-
sponsibility to protect the confidences and secrets of his client still re-
mains. Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility' and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 12 1 the lawyer's responsibil-
ity to protect a client's confidences or secrets is broader than the scope
of the attorney-client privilege. Information in the letters from Smail
and Crowley constituted a "secret" of the client.1 22 Both ethics codes
severely limit the circumstances in which a lawyer is permitted to betray
a confidence or secret of a client. In fact, under both codes, confidential-
ity is valued so highly that a lawyer is not required to divulge a client's
secret even though doing so would prevent serious harm to another. 1
23
It is unclear, therefore, why defense counsel should be required to di-
vulge a client secret and raise competency when counsel believes that
the disclosure will be adverse to the client. Again, neither the Johnson
court nor the drafters of ABA Standard 7-4.2 provide adequate justifi-
cation for overriding the mentally impaired client's right to confidenti-
ality and to zealous representation.
The Johnson decision and ABA Standard 7-4.2 reflect the concern
that mentally incompetent defendants not be subjected to trial. To
achieve that laudable end, the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the ABA
have selected a questionable means: obligating defense counsel to raise
competency. This obligation is designed to serve several purposes.
First, it provides defense counsel a bright-line rule to apply when con-
120. MODEL CODE DR 4-101 and EC 4-4.
121. MODEL RULE 1.6 and comment.
122. A "secret" includes information gained in the professional relationship which: (1) a
client has requested to be kept confidential; or (2) would embarrass or likely be detrimental to the
client if disclosed. MODEL CODE DR 4-101(A). The Model Rules expand the lawyer's duty to pro-
tect a client's confidences by extending confidentiality to any information relating to the represen-
tation of the client. MODEL RULE 1.6 and comment.
123. Under Model Code DR 4-10I(C)(3), a lawyer is permitted but not required to reveal
the intention of his client to commit a crime. Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) also permits a lawyer to disclose
confidential information to prevent a client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes
is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 34, at
671. See also supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
In its recent adoption of the Model Rules, the Wisconsin Supreme Court chose to amend
Rule 1.6. The Wisconsin version mandates that a lawyer shall disclose information the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent a client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or even substantial injury to the financial inter-
est or property of another. See Wis. S. CT. R. 20:1.6 (effective Jan. 1, 1988). See also Subin, The
Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091,
1144-72 (1985) (recognizing the overriding importance that the profession and the Model Rules
place on confidentiality but arguing that the value of confidentiality is grossly overstated and that
attorneys should be obligated to disclose client confidences to prevent harm).
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fronted with a marginally competent defendant. Second, it creates a
fail-safe device to ensure that the State does not prosecute an incompe-
tent person. Third, it protects the rights of criminal defendants to make
fundamental case decisions. The benefits gained by the creation of this
obligation, however, are marginal when compared with the costs to the
client, the lawyer-client relationship, and the adversary system.
Competency determinations are too indefinite and variable to be
neatly resolved by an easily applied bright-line rule."24 Despite this dis-
closure requirement, defense lawyers with mentally impaired clients will
still struggle with tough judgment calls, and their decisions in turn will
generate appellate litigation. Defense counsel's duty to raise compe-
tency will reduce neither the workload of the appellate court nor de-
fense counsel's uncertainty. It will increase the workload of the trial
courts because defense lawyers will be under increased pressure to raise
competency even in marginal cases in order to avoid being labeled inef-
fective or unethical.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court and the ABA may be con-
cerned that some defense lawyers are unable to make reliable judgments
about their clients' competency, this bright-line rule is a drastic measure
to deal with the problem. Most criminal defense lawyers share the con-
cern that an incompetent defendant not be subjected to trial and will
raise the issue in most cases in which they have any reason to doubt
their client's competency. If a lawyer does not adequately investigate
the issue or fails to raise competency without a legitimate reason, that
lawyer's representation should be deemed inadequate. Yet it is neither
unduly burdensome nor difficult to scrutinize trial counsel's reasons for
not acting. ' 25
124. In discussing competency, the United States Supreme Court observed that there are
"no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine
fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and
subtle nuances are implicated." Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975). While the compe-
tency test has been widely criticized as too vague, see, e.g., Appelbaum & Roth, Clinical Issues in
the Assessment of Competency, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1466 (1981); Bacon, Incompetency to
Stand Trial: Commitment to an Inclusive Test, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 444, 446-49 (1969), other com-
mentators have observed that the competency test is necessarily indefinite. Bennett, supra note 36,
at 375, 376-81. ABA Standard 7-4.1(b) does not formulate specific criteria but rather recognizes
that a competency determination is necessarily imprecise requiring a judgment based on the defen-
dant's level of functioning in relation to the complexity of the case. ABA STANDARDS at 7-170 to 7-
175. See also Drob, Berger & Weinstein, supra note 16, at 85; Miller & Germain, supra note 99, at
344.
125. In reviewing other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must review
counsel's reasons for particular decisions or behavior. The court clearly has the capacity to con-
duct such reviews. If the court is concerned about defense lawyers manufacturing reasons after the
fact to explain their failure to raise a competency question, it could require defense counsel to file a
sealed memo with the trial judge explaining why no competency issue was being raised. The memo
would then be opened only in the event of a post-conviction motion challenging the lawyer's effec-
1988:65
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Appellate review of the limited instances in which counsel decides
for strategic reasons not to raise competency is less costly overall to the
criminal justice system than obligating defense counsel to act whenever
she has a reasonable doubt. If defense lawyers strictly adhere to this
duty, they will be raising competency in many cases in which the client
ultimately will be found competent.' 26 This will mean additional court
hearings, unnecessary hospitalization, and increased costs for all of the
major participants in the criminal justice system.
Moreover, even if counsel raises competency, the defendant still
has a right to challenge the doctor's opinion. 2 At this hearing, the
defense lawyer, whose request triggered the evaluation in the first place,
will be representing the defendant. The defendant may be understanda-
bly reluctant to trust defense counsel in view of counsel's previous ac-
tions. Furthermore, defense counsel's role at this hearing will be impos-
sibly complicated. She cannot act as an advocate while at the same time
offering testimony, based in part on confidential communications, that
is adverse to her client.1
28
tiveness. For a similar proposal, see Lee, Right to Effective Counsel: A Judicial Heuristic, 2 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 277, 299-300 (1973).
126. Studies already show that in the vast majority of cases in which defense lawyers raise
competency, the defendant is competent. Bennett, supra note 36, at 391. See, e.g., R. ROESCH & S.
GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL (1980); Bendt, Balcanoff & Tragellis, Incompetency to
Stand Trial: Is Psychiatry Necessary?, 130 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1288 (1973); Steadman & Hartstone,
Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 39 (J. Monahan & H. Steadman eds. 1983).
127. See Wis. STAT. §971.14(4)(b) (1985-1986); State exrel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis.
2d 315, 204 N.W.2d 13 (1973). See also Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 520.
128. MODEL CODE DR 5-102(B) requires a lawyer to withdraw if he may be called as a
witness and his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client. See also MODEL RULES 3.7 and 1.7,
Thus, the defendant's first lawyer who has disclosed information adverse to the client will be re-
quired to withdraw. Presumably, a second lawyer will be provided and permitted to act as the
defendant's advocate since the client has the right to challenge the competency opinion with the
assistance of counsel at this hearing. State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 327, 204
N.W.2d 13, 18-19 (1973). The second lawyer may also find herself trapped in a dilemma should she
also become privy to confidential communications leading her to believe that the client is incompe-
tent. Johnson seemingly would require this second lawyer to communicate her doubts if at, or
subsequent to, the hearing, she also believes her client is incompetent. Johnson could result in a
client having to conduct his own challenge in a competency hearing.
ABA Standard 7-4.8 attempts to deal with this problem by limiting defense counsel's disclo-
sures and the prosecutor's ability to cross-examine defense counsel. Nonetheless, counsel remains
obligated to disclose certain information about her client's competency. ABA Standard 7-4.8(b)
assumes that Model Rules 3.7(a) and 1.7 do not apply because the resolution of competency does
not go to the merits of the case and because counsel does not play an adversary role at this hearing.
ABA STANDARDS at 7-212 to 7-213. No authority supports the claimed inapplicability of Model
Rules 3.7(a) and 1.7. I disagree strongly with this view of counsel's role at a competency hearing
and question whether it comports with defendant's right to due process. See State ex rel. Matalik
v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 327, 204 N.W.2d 13, 18-19 (1973). The commentary acknowledges, at
least, that because of the strain placed on an attorney-client relationship when defendant sees
defense counsel apparently testifying against him, counsel's "autonomous role should be pre-
served intact whenever possible." ABA STANDARDS at 7-213.
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The Johnson court and the drafters of ABA Standard 7-4.2 ask
much but expect little of defense counsel. Although both expect counsel
to provide the mentally impaired defendant with zealous representa-
tion, neither seems willing to trust that advocate to protect the client's
interests. Thus, the Wisconsin Supreme Court obligates defense counsel
to raise competency so that the trial court can ensure that an incompe-
tent defendant is not being unfairly prosecuted. But it is the defense
lawyer, not the trial judge, who is in the best position to know the cli-
ent's options and desires. It is defense counsel who is best able to assess
the strengths and weaknesses of the defendant's case and the need for
and ability of the defendant to assist counsel. Finally, it is defense coun-
sel, committed to securing the best result possible for her client, who
will ensure that competency is raised if it is in the client's interest. 129
Similarly, the State's interest in not unfairly prosecuting an incom-
petent defendant is protected adequately without requiring defense
counsel to act as a double agent. The State is concerned with ensuring
Johnson generates other practical problems. Section 971.14(4)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes
states that the burden of persuasion falls on the party seeking to establish that a defendant is not
competent. If defense counsel raises competency, but the defendant Dbjects, who has the burden of
persuasion? Presumably the State does if it now agrees with defense counsel that the defendant is
not competent. If, however, the State feels the defendant is competent, but the defendant now
agrees with counsel and wishes to be found incompetent, section 971.14(4)(b) places the burden on
the defendant. WIs. STAT. § 971.14(4)(B) (1985-1986). For decisions holding that it violates due
process to require the defendant to prove his competency, see United States ex rel. S.E.C. v. Bil-
lingsley, 766 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1985); Phillips v. Lane, 787 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1986); Brown v.
Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility, 682 F.2d 348 (2nd Cir. 1982); United States v.
Hollis, 569 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir. 1977); People v. McCullum, 66 Ill. 2d 306, 362 N.E.2d 307 (1977);
State v. Jones, 406 N.W.2d 366 (S.D. 1987).
129. In State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980), the court concluded
that defense counsel, not the trial judge, should ensure that the defendant's constitutional right to
testify is jealously guarded. Courts frequently have made defense counsel responsible for asserting
the defendant's rights and found waiver even where counsel has appeared rather lax in protecting
the defendant's rights. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (although due process
precluded State from forcing defendant to be tried in prison garb, failure of defense counsel to
object to defendant's prison clothes at trial negated any constitutional error). As the Estelle court
noted, "Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array
of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests with the
accused and his attorney. Any other approach would rewrite the duties of trial judges and counsel
in our legal system." Id. at 512. Increasingly, however, appellate courts are demanding that trial
judges play a greater role in ensuring that the defendant's rights are fully protected. Remington,
The Changing Role of the Trial Judge in Criminal Cases - Ensuring that the Sixth Amendment
Right to Assistance of Counsel Is Effective, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 339 (1987). As Remington's
article suggests, however, too much is asked of trial judges and not enough of defense counsel, who
bears primary responsibility for safeguarding the defendant's interests. Greater responsibility is
placed on the trial judge in large part because of a belief that counsel's efforts are often inadequate.
Id. at 342. If the court's primary concern is that defense lawyers are not adequately exploring the
competency issue, are not making sound tactical decisions or are usurping decisions that are prop-
erly the defendants', the court could require defense counsel to submit a sealed memorandum in
any case in which the trial judge with questions about counsel's performance deems it appropriate.
See Lee, supra note 125. Finally, if the trial judge believes there is a question about the defendant's
competency, the judge is free to order an evaluation. See infra note 132.
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accurate results, dignified proceedings, and the appearance of fair-
ness. 3 o In most cases involving a mentally impaired defendant, defense
counsel will be able to conduct a sufficient investigation, enabling coun-
sel to assess and challenge the prosecution's case. Defense counsel's ef-
forts and the existence of strong evidence against the defendant gener-
ally obviate the need to raise competency to ensure accurate
adjudications. If, however, counsel has concerns about the defendant's
actual involvement in a crime or believes the defendant's incompetency
is hampering the defense of a case, counsel may be compelled to raise
competency. 131
Moreover, the prosecutor and trial judge play the primary roles in
protecting the State's interests. The prosecutor, through the exercise of
discretion and the use of civil commitment proceedings, substantially
controls the nature and continuation of the process. If the prosecutor or
the trial court feels that the judicial process is being demeaned by pro-
ceeding against an incompetent defendant, either can raise compe-
tency. 132 Similarly, either can raise the issue if defense counsel appears
to be inadequately protecting a mentally ill client. Further, the court
can raise competency sua sponte if the defendant's conduct disrupts the
orderly administration ofjustice. The ability of the trial court and pros-
ecutor to act safeguards the State's interests adequately.
The Johnson court completely ignored the issue of the client's
choice or desires when it obligated defense counsel to raise competency.
ABA Standard 7-4.2 implies that counsel should discuss the compe-
tency issue with the client but concludes that counsel "may move for an
evaluation over the client's objection." Moreover, even if counsel does
not make such a motion, she must still disclose those facts giving rise to
her doubt about the defendant's competence. The commentary to Stan-.
dard 7-4.2 insists that crucial decisions must be made by the defendant
but cannot be made by an incompetent defendant.' 33 However, it does
not follow that, simply because a defense lawyer has doubts about a
defendant's competence, the defendant is incompetent. In fact, studies
indicate that the vast majority of individuals evaluated for competency,
usually at defense counsel's request, are competent. 134 Although the
Standard purportedly promotes the principle of client decisionmaking,
130. ABA STANDARDS at 7-170; Note, supra note 91, at 457-59; Winick, supra note 17, at
953-57.
131. See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
132. WIs. STAT. § 971.14(1) (1985-1986); ABA STANDARD 7-4.2 and commentary; Winick,
supra note 17, at 948; Chernoff& Schaffer, supra note 5, at 507. Indeed, the trial judge has a duty to
raise competency sua sponte if the judge has a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
133. ABA STANDARDS at 7-180 to 7-181.
134. See supra note 126.
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it adopts an unduly rigid view of that principle and of competency
determinations. 135
Standard 7-4.2 seemingly is based on the notion that a competency
determination is an all-or-nothing, clear-cut proposition. If the defen-
dant is competent, he makes all fundamental decisions and, if incompe-
tent, he is incapable of any decisionmaking. Competency, as the Stan-
dards reflect in other sections,' 36 is too indefinite, imprecise, and
context-related to be reduced to such a simple formula.1 37 Many men-
tally ill defendants are capable of discussing their cases and making
decisions. 138 The decisions of the majority of mentally impaired defen-
dants should not be overridden because some incompetent defendants
are incapable of any decisionmaking. Requiring defense counsel to dis-
close a doubt about her client's competence in any case in which she has
one does not necessarily enhance client decisionmaking or client auton-
omy. Rather, it may rob the mentally ill client of an opportunity to
participate in what may be the most significant decision in his case.
In any case involving a mentally impaired defendant, therefore,
defense counsel should discuss the competency issue with her client. If,
after this discussion, the client feels that raising competency is not ad-
vantageous and defense counsel agrees, counsel should be permitted to
respect the client's choice and decline raising competency.' 39 Respect
for the client's choice and the value of individual autonomy also de-
mand nondisclosure of any doubts defense counsel may harbor. Admit-
tedly, counsel is in a difficult position in trying to ascertain whether the
client is capable of making an intelligent choice. The conscientious de-
fense lawyer striving zealously to represent her client ought to be per-
mitted to respect a client's choice when it coincides with the lawyer's
judgment of what is in the client's best interest. Fairness to the incom-
petent defendant-the primary purpose of the incompetency doc-
135. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
136. See ABA STANDARD 7-4.1 and commentary.
137. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. The comment to Model Rule 1.14 and
my professional experience also bear this out.
139. In a variety of situations, the Supreme Court has recognized the defendant's right to
waive important systemic protections even though by doing so the defendant may be affecting the
accuracy of the process. As the Court observed in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975):
It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his partic-
ular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense
ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law."
Id. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). See
also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (defendant may plead guilty despite his contin-
ued assertion of his innocence). For a more detailed discussion of this waiver argument, see
Winick, supra note 17, at 954-57.
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trine-is not served by requiring a properly represented client to invoke
a legal procedure which the client believes is contrary to his interests. 40
A mentally impaired defendant will occasionally choose to face
criminal prosecution rather than suffer the consequences of raising
competency. Just as other criminal defendants are permitted to waive
certain rights if they deem it appropriate, the mentally impaired defen-
dant should be able to do so as long as he is represented by effective
counsel.' 41 By obligating defense counsel to take action which may be
harmful to the mentally impaired client, the American Bar Association
and the Wisconsin Supreme Court have seriously undercut the right of
the mentally impaired to the same zealous representation guaranteed
all other citizens by the sixth amendment. 142 In their effort to protect
the incompetent, the ABA and the court have compromised confidenti-
ality, the lawyer-client relationship, and individual autonomy. Both
should rethink this duty and instead permit defense counsel to play the
role counsel deems appropriate given the particular circumstances of
her client's case.
V. EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION: CASE-BY-CASE DETERMINATIONS
What, then, should be the role of the criminal defense lawyer when
placed in the "unavoidably difficult" position of defending a mentally
impaired client? 143 The answer, in short, is that the role varies from
140. The comment to Model Rule 1.14 insists that the fact of a client's disability does not
diminish the client's right to be treated with attention and respect. The comment also recognizes
that the mere presence of a mental disability does not render the impaired defendant incapable of
making many important decisions. As Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), makes clear,
respect for a defendant's freedom of choice demands that even harmful decisions be honored.
Similarly, respect for the impaired defendant as a person demands, to the fullest extent possible,
that his decisions be honored. See also Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 375-79 (D.C.
1979).
141. See supra note 139. As Bruce Winick persuasively demonstrates, the purposes of the
incompetency doctrine do not justify forcing the defendant to bear the costs of raising compe-
tency. Winick, supra note 17, at 949-59. Assuming that the defendant can articulate a choice-a
choice with which counsel agrees-Winick argues that the defendant should be permitted to waive
competency just as "normal" defendants are permitted to waive other rights. Id. at 959-68. Finally,
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), did not directly address the question of whether compe-
tency could be waived and thus does not bar honoring a defendant's choice to knowingly waive
raising the competency issue. Winick, supra note 17, at 968-75.
142. "More specifically, the right to the assistance of counsel has been understood to
mean that there can be no restriction upon the function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecu-
tion in accord with the traditions of the adversary fact finding process that has been constitutional-
ized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments." Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975).
Placing restrictions on the zealous efforts of a lawyer for a mentally impaired client to defend her
client interferes with the traditional working of the adversary system and offends notions of equal
protection.
143. This question, of course, assumes that the lawyer is not laboring under the Johnson
mandate. For the Wisconsin lawyer, Johnson leaves few options. Counsel can seek a non-criminal
disposition which may obviate the need to raise competency or counsel may legitimately question
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case to case. The decision as to whether to respect a client's question-
able decision, assume a more paternalistic role, or raise competency
depends on the lawyer's careful analysis of the degree of the client's
mental impairment, the importance of the decision being considered,
the type of case, and the costs and benefits to the client of the alternative
courses of action. After undertaking this analysis and fully discussing
the matter with the client, defense counsel will have to make the hard
choice of how to proceed given the circumstances in that particular
case.
Defense counsel should begin this analysis by considering the ex-
tent to which the defendant's mental condition actually interferes with
that person's ability to understand the proceedings or affects the client's
capacity to assist counsel. Counsel must make a judgment regarding the
client's ability to appreciate his legal predicament and to grasp the basic
workings of the adversary system. Additionally, the client must be able
to interact with counsel, process various information, make certain le-
gal decisions, and participate appropriately in court. The lawyer should
direct a series of questions to the client similar to those utilized by
mental health experts when asked to render a competency opinion.144
The questions to be asked should include the following:
1. Does the client understand the roles of the major participants in
the adversary process?
2. Does the client appreciate defense counsel's function, and is he
capable of trusting and working with counsel?
3. Does the client recognize the difference between a guilty plea
and a trial?
4. Is the client aware of the nature of the charges he faces, the seri-
ousness of such charges, and the possible consequences?
5. Is the client capable of discussing the factual basis of the
charges, possible defenses, and problems with accounts given by prose-
cution witnesses?
6. Can the client testify in a relevant, coherent manner?
7. Is the client able to discuss likely outcomes and make choices
regarding plea options or defense strategy?
8. Can the client control his motor and verbal behavior to the ex-
tent that court proceedings will not be disrupted?
whether there is a reasonable doubt about her client's competency and thus decide she is not
required to act. But, if the defendant's mental state does raise a reasonable doubt, counsel's failure
to raise the competency issue violates a clear directive of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Few
lawyers will knowingly take such a step.
144. See generally LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY, HARVARD MEDICAL
SCHOOL, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1974); Robey, supra note 99. See
also State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 299 N.W.2d 538 (1980) (proposing a list of criteria to apply in
analyzing a defendant's competency).
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A negative response to one or several of these questions does not
necessarily mean that the client is incompetent. Many low-income,
poorly educated or emotionally disturbed defendants will not fare well
if similarly questioned.' 4 ' Nonetheless, the more unsatisfactory the
defendant's responses, the more doubtful is the defendant's
competency.
The next step defense counsel should take is to assess the advan-
tages and disadvantages to the client of raising the competency issue.
This is not a task to be completed once, but an ongoing process that
involves a skillful weighing of all of the particular circumstances of the
case. Like the defendant's mental condition, this assessment may
change rapidly and dramatically. Delay, for example, may initially
work to the client's favor, but the prospect of a new prosecutor or judge
being assigned to the case may mean that a speedy disposition is now
advantageous. 146 Competency may be raised at any time in the pro-
ceeding' 4 7 and defense counsel must be constantly alert to changes in
the defendant's mental condition and in the cost-benefit analysis of rais-
ing competency.
In analyzing the merits of raising competency, counsel should rec-
ognize that some defendants improve significantly from the medication
or treatment provided in a hospital setting. 14 ' In addition, pretrial in-
carceration in the county jail may be extremely hazardous, even deadly,
145. See Note, supra note 91, at 459; Winick, supra note 17, at 971.
146. ABA Standard 7-4.2(e) declares that it is improper for a lawyer to use a competency
evaluation for any purpose unrelated to determining the defendant's competency, such as to ob-
tain favorable plea negotiations or delay the proceedings to obtain an advantage. See also Bennett,
supra note 36, at 382-83 (suggesting that obtaining delay is an inappropriate use of the incompe-
tency process). The drafters of the Mental Health Standards suggest that the negative aspects and
injustices of the competency process will be eliminated by the adoption of the Standards. Until
that ideal state is obtained, however, defense counsel should raise competency if the client and
lawyer feel it is in the client's best interest to do so even if the lawyer's primary reason for doing so
is to obtain a favorable delay. See infra note 158. This assumes, of course, that there is some
legitimate basis for questioning the client's competency. Given the imprecise nature of a compe-
tency determination, it is neither realistic nor sound policy to attempt to restrict defense counsel's
ability to raise competency for the client's benefit.
147. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). Many state statutes have wording similar to
that of section 971.14(l)(a) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which provides that the trial court "shall
proceed under this section whenever there is reason to doubt a defendant's competency to pro-
ceed." WIs. STAT. § 971.14(l)(a) (1985-1986). See also Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 507.
148. As a public defender, I represented several clients whose severe impairments made it
impossible for me to communicate at all with them. In several instances, these clients made dra-
matic improvements after only a short stint in a mental hospital. Clearly, however, inpatient treat-
ment is frequently not required. While a client's competency may be restored by medication, that
medication can be provided on an outpatient basis eliminating the need and expense of an inpa-
tient competency evaluation. See ABA STANDARD 7-4.3 and commentary (condemning automatic
commitment for inpatient evaluations and urging that competency examinations be done in the
least-restrictive setting possible).
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to the mentally ill defendant. '49 On the other hand, raising competency
may adversely affect the defendant. For many defendants, hospitaliza-
tion may be counterproductive.' 5 0 A lengthy stay in such an institution
may be far less therapeutic than the defendant's normal routine or out-
patient relationship with a counselor. Moreover, for a defendant
charged with a simple misdemeanor, raising competency may greatly
increase the number of days that the defendant is institutionalized.
Raising competency may also alert the prosecution to the existence
of a mental condition and may therefore lead to involuntary commit-
ment proceedings against the defendant. Similarly, the judge may view
the defendant more harshly, and, hence, may either increase or refuse to
lower bail. Defense counsel's expression of concern about a defendant's
mental condition is likely to lead the prosecutor or judge to insist on
probation for a defendant who otherwise may have only been fined. For
some clients, this is a substantial cost. 5 '
Additionally, raising competency gives the State's experts the op-
portunity to assess the defendant. Their early assessment may cripple
the defendant's opportunity to raise an insanity defense. Further, the
defendant may provide damaging information during the evaluation
that will be used against the client at trial or at sentencing. 1 5 2 in some
cases, however, there are strategic advantages to be gained by raising
competency. The State's experts may make observations and render
opinions supportive of the defendant's insanity claims.' The State's
experts may also agree that the defendant is incompetent and unlikely
to regain competency during the pendency of the action. As a result, the
149. While confined in a county jail, the mentally ill defendant may harm himself or
others. Moreover, other inmates may taunt or physically abuse the mentally ill inmate.
150. See supra note 24.
151. In my experience, mentally impaired clients frequently fare poorly on probation.
Overworked probation agents generally lack the resources, time or skill to handle the mentally ill
probationer. The clients' inability to follow through with the conditions placed upon them by their
probation agents often results in detention holds, revocation proceedings and, finally, lengthy jail
sentences.
152. See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 5 1, at 1-209. The extent to which a defendant's state-
ments made during a competency evaluation can be used against him is unclear. See Buchanan v.
Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 2906, reh'g denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3164 (U.S. Aug. 26, 1987) (a defense request
for a pretrial competency examination opened the door for the prosecution to present evidence at
trial based on that examination to rebut other psychological evidence presented by the defense).
Arguably Buchanan does not apply if counsel raises competency over the objection of the defen-
dant. In Wisconsin, statements made during a competency evaluation are inadmissible in any
proceeding except on the issue of the defendant's mental condition. Wis. STAT. § 971.18 (1985-
1986). See also ABA STANDARD 7-4.6 and commentary (information gained during competency
evaluation should be considered privileged and only used to determine competency).
153. See supra note 146 regarding the issue of the propriety of defense counsel's raising
competency to secure other benefits for the client. See also Mitchell v. United States, 316 F.2d 354,
360 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (recognized purpose of competency evaluation is to obtain evidence to decide
whether to raise insanity defense).
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case may be dismissed.' 54 Even if the case is not dismissed, the delay in
the proceedings may work to the defendant's advantage in securing a
favorable plea bargain or defusing adverse pretrial publicity. Of course,
the delay of the criminal case may also constitute a serious disadvan-
tage if this delay has a negative effect on the defendant's trial. 155
The time defense counsel has to consider the competency issue will
vary greatly, again depending on the circumstances of each case. The
degree of the client's mental impairment often determines the time
available to counsel to explore the issue. If defense counsel is having
difficulty communicating with a client, counsel should generally seek
the assistance of a privately retained expert before raising compe-
tency.' 56 In addition to providing guidance on the competency ques-
tion, that expert should also be used to secure information about the
viability of an insanity defense. The expert's opinion regarding the mer-
its of an insanity defense will often be a crucial factor in defense coun-
sel's assessment of the costs of raising the competency issue.
Before choosing a particular role in a case, defense counsel must
also consider the seriousness of the charge lodged against the defen-
dant, the strength of the State's evidence, and the availability as well as
relative merit of different courses of action. Some commentators, for
example, suggest that competency not be raised unless the charges
against the defendant carry heavy penalties and the State's case is
strong. 1 57 In some misdemeanor cases, however, the mere threat of
raising competency may be sufficient to convince an overworked prose-
cutor to offer a non-criminal disposition.15 8 Yet that same approach
with a different prosecutor may land the defendant in a mental hospital
154. Section 971.14(6) of the Wisconsin Statutes requires the court to dismiss a criminal
charge and release a defendant from a commitment when the defendant is unlikely to become
competent within the remaining commitment period. The statute permits the court, however, to
order the defendant delivered to a treatment facility so that the State can commence civil commit-
ment proceedings. WIs. STAT. § 971.14(6) (1985-1986).
155. For example, crucial defense witnesses may leave the jurisdiction while the defendant
is regaining competency. See also Winick, supra note 17, at 947-49.
156. See A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 51, at 1-207. In Wisconsin, a lawyer representing an
indigent defendant may obtain funds to retain an expert through the local branch of the State
Public Defender's office. In fact, proceeding without any expert in a case with mental health issues
may not only be "foolhardy," see United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1047
(E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977), it may be
ineffective assistance of counsel. See supra note 18.
157. See, e.g., A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 51, at 1-207.
158. In order to obtain a good disposition for a client, a lawyer will employ a host of
different tactics and strategems. As any text on litigation techniques demonstrates, lawyers often
take non-legal factors into consideration in the negotiation process. As long as there is some fac-
tual basis for the lawyer's use of the competency process, the defense lawyer should be allowed to
utilize the process to her client's advantage. If the lawyer for the mentally impaired defendant
cannot use the competency process to secure a favorable result for the client (see supra note 146) it
is clear that the mentally impaired defendant is being provided something less than a zealous
advocate.
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for thirty days or more instead of the fine which the prosecutor was
prepared to offer.
Defense counsel must be familiar, therefore, with the likely re-
sponses of the other actors in the criminal justice system to the mentally
ill defendant in order to assess accurately the defendant's available op-
tions. Even in serious cases, the creative criminal defense lawyer may be
able to work out solutions for a mentally impaired defendant other
than raising competency.159 It will generally take some time for defense
counsel to carefully analyze the defendant's particular circumstances.
While analyzing the competency issue, defense counsel should pursue
non-criminal dispositions that may obviate the need to resolve the
issue, 160
The final and most important step in defense counsel's decision-
making process is to discuss the competency issue as thoroughly as pos-
sible with the defendant. Although the defendant's mental illness may
make this a time-consuming, frustrating discussion, it is imperative that
counsel take the necessary time to ensure that the client understands as
fully as possible the significance and consequences of raising compe-
tency. Many mentally ill defendants are capable of making choices and
articulating desires or goals. 161 It may be necessary, however, for de-
fense counsel to listen patiently to a barrage of conflicting wishes before
identifying the client's primary goal. As with many criminal defendants,
the mentally impaired defendant may be very reluctant to choose from
any of the limited undesirable options available. Reluctance to choose
should not be equated with incompetence. As with other defendants,
defense counsel often must push her mentally impaired client to make
choices. Unlike other defendants, however, counsel must then decide
whether the mentally impaired client's choice should be respected.
It may be useful to think of mentally impaired clients along a con-
tinuum. At one end is the client who is a rational decisionmaker fully
capable of grasping every aspect of a case, able to articulate goals, and
ready to make informed decisions. On the other end is the comatose
client seemingly totally unaware of anything defense counsel says, una-
ble to articulate any goals, and incapable of making any choices. The
closer the mentally ill client is to the rational decisionmaker end of the
159. Assuming that the client agrees with the lawyer's approach and is capable of entering
a plea, the lawyer may be able to persuade the prosecutor to offer a favorable plea agreement. Such
an agreement may include probation with conditions such as a structured living arrangement for
the client, outpatient counseling, alcohol or drug abuse treatment, monitored medication or re-
strictions on the client's activities. But see supra note 151.
160. ABA Standard 4-6.1 imposes a duty on defense counsel to explore diversion of a
client's case from the criminal justice system. Some prosecutors will be willing to hold a mentally
impaired defendant's criminal case open for a stated period with a promised dismissal if the client
stays out of trouble, stays on medication or cooperates in a treatment program for that period.
161. See supra notes 44, 45 and 138 and accompanying text.
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continuum, the more defense counsel should respect the defendant's
choice on raising competency. The more the client can make choices
and articulate goals, the more likely it is that the defendant is indeed
competent. Near the other end of the continuum, defense counsel will
be able to place little weight on the defendant's expressed choice. It may
be that the client's choice is hopelessly unclear or that counsel seriously
doubts the client's capacity to understand or process information. The
more substantial the client's mental impairment, the harder it becomes
for defense counsel to respect the client's desire not to raise
competency.
Defense counsel's role in representing a mentally impaired defen-
dant, therefore, requires counsel to balance the client's choice with the
seriousness of the client's mental impairment, the nature of the defen-
dant's case, and the lawyer's assessment of the costs and benefits of
various actions. The lawyer's role will be clear in any case in which the
client and defense counsel agree that competency should be raised. That
role is less straightforward when the client insists on raising competency
even though the lawyer feels that doing so is not in the client's best
interest. Nevertheless, the client's right to make fundamental case deci-
sions, the value of client autonomy, and the uncertainty of judgments
regarding competency require defense counsel to provide the defendant
an opportunity to litigate competency if the defendant so desires. 162
Some clients will state unequivocally that they do not want compe-
tency raised. 163 Despite doubts about a client's competency, defense
counsel should respect that client's choice when, as in Johnson, counsel
agrees that raising competency is not in the client's best interest.164 De-
fense counsel should continue then to play her normal role of zealous
advocate as long as there is agreement between counsel and her client
on all fundamental case decisions.
Occasionally, a mentally impaired defendant may insist on making
a fundamental decision that the lawyer deems disastrous and not in the
client's best interest. For example, assume the defendant refuses a pros-
ecutor's offer to reduce a felony to a misdemeanor with a recommenda-
162. See State ex rel. Matalik v. Schubert, 57 Wis. 2d 315, 325, 204 N.W.2d 13, 17-18
(1973) (a defendant is entitled to a hearing on the question of competency); Chernoff& Schaffer,
supra note 5, at 520. This does not mean, of course, that the lawyer should not seek to persuade the
defendant to reassess a poor choice. As Paul Tremblay points out, however, persuasion can easily
become coercive manipulation. Tremblay, supra note 15, at 582. Although Tremblay believes that
the use of persuasion protects client autonomy far better than other alternatives, such as formal or
de facto guardianship, he concludes that a lawyer is not justified in simply manipulating the client
to select a choice the lawyer deems best. Id. at 577-83. For a further discussion of various persua-
sive techniques and the appropriateness of their use, see D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 19, at
203-10.
163. In particular, clients with prior negative experiences in the mental health system or
strong feelings about drugs may be resistant to raising competency.
164. See supra notes 129-41 and accompanying text.
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tion of credit for time served, but even in the face of overwhelming
evidence demands a jury trial on the felony charge even though convic-
tion carries a mandatory prison term. Defense counsel cannot simply
plead the client guilty to the misdemeanor. 165 Counsel will have to re-
spect the defendant's decision to try the case or else raise compe-
tency. 166 But should competency be raised over the client's objection?
Defense counsel's decision turns on the degree of the client's im-
pairment and the relative costs or benefits of respecting the defendant's
wishes. The "normal" client is afforded the right to make his own deci-
sions, even harmful ones, because society values highly the individual's
freedom to choose for himself what constitutes his best interest. 167 So-
ciety restricts the mentally impaired person's right to choose because it
lacks confidence in that person's capacity to make informed decisions.
In short, since we do not know why the impaired client is making a
seemingly irrational choice, we are reluctant to honor his choice. It fol-
lows, then, that the further a defendant is from the rational deci-
sionmaker end of the continuum, the more willing counsel should be to
override a defendant's disastrous choice and raise competency.' 68
Counsel's role will be particularly clear when the client's irrational
decision is inconsistent with the client's primary case objective or when
that decision is obviously disastrous to the client's well-being. The more
irrational the client's insistence is on not raising competency when that
insistence runs contrary to the client's own stated goals, the easier the
lawyer's decision is to raise the issue. If the impaired client's irrational
choice impinges significantly upon counsel's ability to pursue her strate-
165. Bookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966). It is the defendant's decision whether to
plead guilty. See supra note 13.
166. Again, this assumes that counsel already has attempted to change the defendant's
poor decision. See supra note 162.
167. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
168. David Binder and Susan Price, supra note 19, at 155, posit the general rule that
lawyers should intervene in a client's decision if that decision will result in substantial economic,
social or psychological harm in return for little gain. They suggest that before allowing a client to
make an extremely detrimental decision, the lawyer request the appointment of a guardian. Id. at
205. Model Rule 1. 14(b) suggests that counsel may either seek a guardian or take other protective
action when the lawyer reasonably believes the client cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest. In some jurisdictions, in a comparable situation involving the defendant's decision to
waive an insanity defense, the trial court is given the discretion to appoint a guardian to advise the
court whether to honor the defendant's decision. See Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364
(D.C. 1979); Anderson v. Sorrell, 481 A.2d 766 (D.C. 1984). Obtaining a guardian requires defense
counsel to disclose confidential information or at least alert the prosecutor and judge to the defen-
dant's impaired condition, possibly leading to the adverse results that the defendant and defense
counsel are seeking to avoid. Instead of seeking a guardian, defense counsel and the defendant
should undertake the analysis suggested in this Article and make the difficult decision regarding
competency. By such action, defense counsel is taking appropriate protective action to secure the
best possible result for the client. For a detailed discussion of the difficulties of the guardian alter-
native, even in the civil setting, see Tremblay, supra note 15, at 559-67.
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gic means of achieving the client's desired ends, counsel should raise
competency.
It is not appropriate for counsel merely to substitute her judgment
as to what case disposition is in the client's best interest. In some cases,
however, no rational person would dispute what constitutes a defen-
dant's best interest. Take the example of the defendant who turns down
the misdemeanor plea to take the hopeless felony case to trial. Since it is
highly unlikely that a rational decisionmaker would opt to take an ut-
terly hopeless felony case to trial and risk a mandatory prison sentence
rather than plead to a misdemeanor charge for time served, counsel
should raise competency over the objection of her mentally impaired
client.169 On the other hand, if it is a close call whether raising compe-
tency will benefit the client or if it is unclear that the client will be
harmed by pursuing his course of action rather than defense counsel's,
counsel should respect the client's wishes and not raise competency.
In the Johnson case, if Kagan-Kans was correct that the lesser in-
cluded jury instruction decision was his to make, then he properly de-
clined to raise competency. Johnson did not want to raise the issue, and
Kagan-Kans had strategic reasons for agreeing with him. Moreover,
since Kagan-Kans could proceed with his proposed defense despite
Johnson's irrational objections, Johnson's impairment did not interfere
with his ability to assist counsel.
On the other hand, if Kagan-Kans was incorrect and the lesser
included instruction decision was a fundamental case decision that
counsel could not make, his position would indeed have been unavoid-
ably difficult. He would first have had to confront Johnson with his
dilemma and advise him that, unless they resolved their dispute over
case strategy, he would raise competency. If Johnson continued to ob-
ject both to Kagan-Kans's strategy and to raising competency, Kagan-
Kans would then have had to raise the issue. The seriousness of the
charge and the dire consequences of Johnson's choice of strategy would
not permit counsel to respect Johnson's choice.17
0
169. Chernoff and Schaffer argue that such an approach is unsatisfactory for two reasons.
First, it elevates counsel's subjective judgment as to what is rational over the client's and, second, it
may be merely postponing matters, for the client may return competent but still opposed to coun-
sel's decision. Chernoff & Schaffer, supra note 5, at 527. Some clients will undoubtedly return
competent and still want to make the same disastrous decision. They should be permitted to do so.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Others, however, will now make the "rational" deci-
sion. Assuming counsel is conscientious and mindful to exercise this override function only in
clear-cut cases, individual autonomy will not be unduly compromised.
170. See supra notes 168 and 169 and accompanying text. Respect for individual auton-
omy does not require that defense counsel blindly rely on the choices of a defendant whose reason-
ing is suspect. Brennan v. Blankenship, 472 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Va. 1979), af'd, 624 F.2d 1093 (4th
Cir. 1980) (lawyer found ineffective for failing to develop only possible defense in case because
client indicated he was not interested in raising insanity).
HeinOnline  -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 106 1988
1988:65 Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?
Assume, however, that Johnson was evaluated and determined to
be competent and yet he persisted in opposing Kagan-Kans's defensive
strategy. At this point, again assuming that the lesser included instruc-
tion decision is a fundamental one reserved ultimately for the client,
Kagan-Kans would have had to accept Johnson's disastrous
decision. 171
In any case in which defense counsel raises competency over the
client's objection, counsel should attempt to minimize the adverse ef-
fects on the lawyer-client relationship. Counsel should not disclose any
confidential communications but simply indicate that, in her opinion, a
competency evaluation is warranted.172 If counsel's testimony is re-
quired, she will have to withdraw from the case. In addition, counsel
should fully advise the client of her reasons for raising competency and
inform the defendant of his right to a hearing to challenge the report
prepared by the competency evaluator.' 7 3 Counsel should also offer to
withdraw if the client desires a new lawyer.
Finally, there are some defendants who are unable to discuss the
competency issue, to articulate any goals, or to make any fundamental
decisions. For some of these impaired clients, the best approach may be
to wait briefly to see how the client responds before making any deci-
sion regarding competency. In some cases, freedom from alcohol or
drugs, the stark reality of jail, or the return to medication will improve
the client's ability to communicate with counsel. During this brief wait-
171. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. See also Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d
1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 1983) (lawyer wanted to present second degree murder defense based on
depraved mind but defendant refused to allow defense; court held that defense lawyer bound to
follow wishes of competent client even though detrimental); Alvord v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282,
1289 (11 th Cir. 1984) (lawyer who honored defendant's decision not to raise insanity defense not
ineffective despite defendant's mental illness because judge found defendant competent and only
psychiatrist to examine him regarding insanity considered the defendant sane).
172. The trial court generally will accept defense counsel's representation that an evalua-
tion is appropriate without an evidentiary showing, especially if the court's observations suggest
that the defendant is mentally ill. Winick & DeMeo, Competence to Stand Trial in Florida, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 31, 39 (1980). See also ABA STANDARD 7-4.2 (recommending that if defense counsel
raises competence counsel should not divulge confidential communications); ABA STANDARD 7-
4.8 and commentary (discussing the importance of protecting confidentiality and the attorney-
client privilege). If the court is concerned that defense counsel's request for an evaluation is a
delaying tactic, it could require counsel to file a sealed memo detailing why counsel feels a compe-
tency evaluation is warranted. The memo would remain sealed unless the evaluation indicated that
there was no possible basis for believing that the defendant was incompetent. In such a rare case,
the court, at the conclusion of the criminal case, could hold a contempt hearing to determine if
counsel had acted improperly in requesting a competency hearing. The need to file a sealed memo
and the threat of contempt will deter the few lawyers who would use a frivolous competency
request to gain a desired delay. Given the imprecision of judgments about competency and the
fluctuations in some defendants' mental conditions, it should be very difficult, however, to find a
lawyer's request for a competency evaluation to be frivolous.
173. See supra note 127; Wis. STAT. § 971.14(4)(b) (1985-1986). See also ABA STANDARD
7-4.8 (spelling out the rights to be afforded a defendant at a competency hearing).
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ing period, counsel should make every effort, consistent with respecting
client confidentiality, to secure information from family, friends, or
mental health professionals about the client. The lawyer should again
attempt to discuss the case and the competency issue with the client
before deciding how to proceed.
In cases in which defendants remain uncommunicative and incapa-
ble of articulating any choices, the role of defense counsel again in-
volves more than just automatically raising the competency issue. A
necessary first step is to undertake an analysis of the merits of raising
the issue given the circumstances of the defendant's case. For some cli-
ents, the most appropriate action the lawyer could take would be to
persuade the prosecutor to dismiss the charges or to pursue civil com-
mitment proceedings. Such action may be warranted when the charges
facing the client are minor, the client can be quickly stabilized on medi-
cation, or the client's living situation is very stable. In other instances,
the client's mental condition may be so aggravated that, even though
the charge is fairly minor, the lawyer has no recourse but to raise com-
petency.' 74 Similarly, when the client's ability to communicate is se-
verely restricted and the nature of the case is such that the client's ver-
sion of the incident is crucial, counsel may be compelled to raise the
competency issue. For a few incompetent, uncommunicative clients,
however, counsel may identify a course of action, other than raising
competency, which would allow her to resolve the case favorably for
the client. In such a rare case, counsel should be permitted to play a
paternalistic role and secure that favorable result for the client without
raising competency. "75
174. For example, the client charged with criminal trespass to dwelling may be physically
abusive to himself or others. Thus, counsel may feel compelled to raise competency to facilitate the
defendant's transfer to a hospital.
175. Consider, for example, the case of a mentally ill defendant charged with criminal
damage to property for intentionally breaking a store window. Because the defendant has engaged
in similar conduct in the past, the defendant is arrested and jailed. The next morning the prosecu-
tor charges the defendant but, prior to the initial appearance, offers to recommend a sentence of
"time served" in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea. Defense counsel attempts to discuss the
case with the defendant but soon recognizes that the defendant is incompetent. The defendant,
badly shaken, pleads with counsel to help him get home. Counsel is then approached by the defen-
dant's mother who confirms the long-standing nature of the defendant's condition. Defense coun-
sel urges the prosecutor to drop the case or at least not oppose defendant's release without cash
bail. The prosecutor refuses, saying that despite the defendant's mental problems, his conduct
warrants a conviction. If counsel concludes that the defendant will not be released on bail, she
should assist her client in entering a plea so as to secure his release. Raising competency or litigat-
ing the case will result in needlessly extending the defendant's detention. While counsel ultimately
may be able to get the case dismissed by raising competency, most clients would prefer to take the
proposed offer and go home. In such a case, therefore, counsel should be permitted to take this
"protective action" and obtain the result that appears to be consistent with the client's wishes and
best interests. See MODEL RULE 1. 14. Additionally, counsel's actions are in keeping with the princi-
ple of client autonomy spelled out in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). While under
existing case law a trial judge may not accept a guilty plea without a knowing and intelligent
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VI. CONCLUSION
The role of the criminal defense lawyer in deciding whether to raise
competency is indeed unavoidably difficult. The rule announced in the
Johnson decision and set forth in ABA Standard 7-4.2 does not make
that role any easier. By requiring defense counsel to act as an officer or
friend of the court, the Johnson court unduly impinges upon the lawyer-
client relationship, compromises zealous representation, and undercuts
the defendant's right to individual autonomy. The case-by-case ap-
proach suggested in this Article allows defense counsel to play the role
of zealous advocate. Such an approach will not eliminate tough judg-
ment calls for defense counsel, for the indeterminacy of the competency
issue and the varying circumstances of each case require different re-
sponses. In fashioning a response, however, the lawyer should respect,
to the fullest extent possible, the value of client autonomy and provide
her client the same zealous representation she would afford any other
criminal defendant.
waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights, Horace v. Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1558 (11 th Cir.
1986), many trial judges in practice would accept the plea of an incompetent defendant under the
circumstances described in this footnote. See also Winick, supra note 17, at 959-79 (arguing that
such pleas ought to be accepted even under existing case law).
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